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We take notice that since early in the 19th Century there have
been marked differences between the United States Congress
and other parliamentary bodies.
One is the greater
development of the committee system here . . . . Committee
chairmen and members naturally develop interest and
expertise in the subjects entrusted to their continuing
surveillance. Officials in the executive branch have to take
these committees into account and keep them informed,
respond to their inquiries, and it may be, flatter and please
them when necessary. Committees do not need even the type of
“report and wait” provision we have here to develop
enormous influence over executive branch doings. There is
nothing unconstitutional about this: indeed, our separation of
powers makes such informal cooperation much more necessary
than it would be in a pure system of parliamentary
government.1
Although more than a century has passed since the birth of the
administrative state in the United States, a great deal of uncertainty
remains concerning the actual and appropriate distribution of power
within the government. There is a continuing struggle between the
President and Congress over control of the administration. Legal
conflicts have resulted from innovations of more or less recent vintage,
including legislative and line-item vetoes,2 congressional appointment of
members of independent agencies,3 assignment of administrative tasks to

1. City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down line-item veto);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto).
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding, inter alia, appointment of
members of Federal Election Commission by the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate improper).
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officials under the control of Congress,4 and the creation of a mechanism
for the appointment (by an Article III court) of a prosecutor outside the
control of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute executive
branch misconduct.5 Another set of skirmishes has involved assignment
of power to adjudicate disputes among private parties to non-Article III
tribunals such as agencies6 and arbitrators.7
Disputes concerning the proper distribution of power over the
administration of the laws have also arisen in somewhat more rarified
constitutional contexts.8 There have been two attempts in recent decades
to revive the nondelegation doctrine, which in some circumstances limits
the power Congress may grant to the President and administrative
agencies.9 Legislation passed relating to an administrative matter during
the pendency of judicial review litigation has also been attacked as
usurping the judicial role.10 And Congress has been twice rebuffed

4. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller
General, an official subject to removal by joint resolution of Congress, may not exercise
authority to enforce budget controls).
5. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act concerning the appointment and removal of independent
counsel with authority to investigate and prosecute executive branch officials).
6. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(upholding assignment to Commodity Futures Trading Commission to adjudicate state
law counterclaims in dispute between commodities broker and customer).
7. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(upholding mandatory binding arbitration, with limited judicial review, of compensation
claim by pesticide registrant against private party wishing to make use of trade secrets
contained in registration materials).
8. For an overview of separation of powers disputes between Congress and the
President, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (1985).
9. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting novel
holding of D.C. Circuit that the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation doctrine
because the EPA failed to articulate standards under which it would exercise regulatory
discretion); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the OSH Act violated nondelegation doctrine);
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (noting that if the OSH Act lacked threshold requirement before
agency may regulate workplace, it might be unconstitutional under the nondelegation
doctrine); id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
OSH Act violated the nondelegation doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992)
(upholding legislation passed during the pendency of judicial review that, in effect,
legislatively approved the administrative action under review).
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when it attempted to retain control over the administration of the airports
in the Washington, D.C. area.11
There have also been numerous nonconstitutional administrative law
controversies that implicate the allocation of power to control the
administration of the laws. Many of these controversies center on
appropriate standards of judicial review: May courts impose procedural
requirements on agencies when, in the courts’ judgment, APA
procedures are insufficient?12 How much and when should courts defer
to agency policy decisions13 or agency interpretations of statutes?14
When is an agency decision beyond the reach of judicial review?15 May
the President or members of Congress communicate with administrative
officials about matters pending before the agency16 or force the agency
to submit some or all administrative decisions to review by agents of the
President?17 These issues, while not explicitly constitutional, have
implications for the distribution of power among the President,
Congress, agencies and the courts.
Underlying many of these controversies is a fact that is insufficiently
noted in legal scholarship—that Congress is deeply involved in the day
to day administration of the law.18 In recent years, at least since
11. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding members of Congress may not serve on Board of
Review with power to overrule decisions of Airport Authority); Hechinger v. Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress may not
require appointments to Board of Directors of Airport Authority be made from lists
supplied by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate).
12. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (stating that courts lack power, absent unconstitutionality, to impose
procedures in addition to those statutorily required).
13. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988).
16. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (2005).
18. There has been some very good legal scholarship on this point, including
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); and
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1525 (1992). However, the political science literature on congressional
oversight of the administration of the law is much more developed. See, e.g., Arthur
Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, The
Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (1985); Seymour
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President Reagan’s precedent-setting Executive Order 12,291, which
subjected administrative rules to centralized review by the Office of
Management and Budget, there has been a resurgence of direct
Presidential supervision of the administrative state, and this phenomenon
has received significant attention in legal academia.19 Congress’s
involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although
most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the
dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it
loses control over how its laws are administered. Under this dominant
image, the only mechanisms that prevent the administration from
ignoring Congress’s goals altogether are judicial review and the
possibility of further legislation.20 This article is an attempt to initiate a
Scher, Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case
Study, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1960); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991).
Further, administrative law has not been sufficiently influenced by the realities of
congressional oversight.
19. The classic recent work is Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). It is clear, as Dean Kagan describes, that the President has
become much more directly involved in agency action in recent decades. See also
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (discussing
the dominance of executive power); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Terry M. Moe, Regulatory
Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the
Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180 (1994); Thomas O. Sargentich, The
Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 231, 241, 247-55
(1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
20. In the early days of review of regulations under President Reagan’s Executive
Order 12,291, there was a great deal of commentary on whether centralized review was
proper in light of Congress’s usual practice of delegating regulatory authority directly to
a particular agency. See Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test
Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988); Colin S.
Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity,
Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443
(1987); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential
Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised
by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199 (1981). Now that review under the
successors to 12,291 is an entrenched and accepted element of the administrative
process, scholarship has focused on its justifications, its effects, and its limits. See
William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over
Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2002); Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003); John O.
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901 (2001)
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greater appreciation of Congress’s role in the administration of the laws
and to infuse that understanding into certain key features of
administrative law.
In the political science and public policy literature, the understanding
of Congress’s role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that
Congress is not sufficiently engaged21 to a recognition that Congress
gets involved when it is worth it in terms of gaining political support
from oversight activities.22 In a seminal paper reconstructing our
understanding of Congress’s supervisory role, McCubbins and Schwartz
compared Congress’s oversight of agencies to police patrols and fire
alarms. Police patrols involve constant supervision under which the
“police” are ever searching for problems. Under fire alarm supervision,
the department sits back and waits for someone to pull the alarm
indicating that there is a problem. This theory holds that while it may
not be worth it very often for Congress to devote “police patrol”
resources to oversight, members gain a great deal of political credit for
“putting out fires” called in by constituents.23 Thus, the appearance of
lack of oversight may in actuality reflect a rational decision that in most
cases it is more cost-effective to sit back and wait for an alarm. The
proliferation of congressional casework is also a reflection of this reality.
On the other hand, the high volume of reports that agencies are
required to file with Congress and the constant monitoring of agencies
that Congress performs indicates that some more generalized, police
patrol type oversight is worthwhile. Police departments find it
(arguing that presidential review helps restore control over excessive delegation to
agencies); Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18, at 1068-75.
21. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979).
22. Mathew D. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the
Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma, REGULATION, Summer 1999, at 30; Mathew
D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). I do not mean to argue that
there is general agreement that Congress is more powerful than the President or vice
versa. Political scientist Robert Spitzer recognizes that Congress has the tools to exert
control over the execution of the law, but argues that a careful examination of
institutional realities reveals that the President exercises “hegemony” over the U.S.
government despite the availability of tools with which Congress could resist
presidential domination. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE
HEGEMONY AT THE CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1993); see also Lucy
Drotning & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Predicting Bureaucratic Control: Evidence from
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 21 LAW & POL’Y 1 (1999) (noting disparate views
on degree of congressional control and constructing an empirical test to determine the
conditions under which oversight is likely).
23. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation, supra note 22, at 33 (“Political leaders
are therefore likely to prefer the low-risk, high-reward strategy of fire-alarm
oversight . . . .”); see also Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN
THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
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worthwhile to send officers out in automobiles, airplanes, helicopters
and boats looking for problems, and even fire departments do some
inspections without waiting for an alarm. Similarly, Congress requires
thousands of periodic reports from agencies, holds numerous hearings
and sends the Government Accountability Office (GAO)24 out looking
for problems even in the absence of a pulled alarm. While the
McCubbins and Schwartz model is obviously a very powerful conceptual
tool for understanding the incentives underlying oversight, the high
volume of oversight that is not responsive to particular alarms
contradicts the prediction that there will be little in the way of police
patrol type oversight.25 To the contrary, oversight, like police patrols,
seems to be everywhere, whether alarms are being sounded or not.26
Congress’s oversight of and involvement in the administration of the
laws is a result of the unique structure of the U.S. government.
Ironically, as the above quoted passage from an opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognizes, the brand of separation of
powers practiced in the United States is a significant cause of Congress’s
ongoing intervention into executive branch activity. In most countries
with parliamentary systems, principal executive officers are drawn from
the legislature, and they are a natural conduit for legislative input into
the execution of the law. In the United States, with the constitutional
prohibition of contemporaneous service in both Congress and the
executive branch, other channels are necessary, and sometimes it

24. The role of the GAO in congressional oversight of agencies is discussed infra
at notes 314-322 and accompanying text.
25. It is somewhat difficult in some situations to distinguish between police patrol
and fire alarm oversight. Many, if not most, legislative and regulatory initiatives are in
response to an alarm sounded by a group of constituents demanding resolution of a
problem or favorable governmental treatment, just as the level of police patrols in a
community is likely to be very responsive to the articulated demands of the citizenry.
Once a regulatory program is in place, the constant monitoring of agency performance
that Congress tends to do may be thought of as responsive to the initial “alarm” that
resulted in the regulatory program, or it may be viewed as police patrol oversight if no
new alarm precipitated the particular instance of oversight.
26. An additional difficulty is that there is no clear normative baseline for judging
whether the amount of congressional oversight of the executive branch is proper. This
makes it very hard to come to a conclusion on whether Congress is fulfilling its role as
legislator or whether it has abdicated that role to executive decisionmaking. Basic
economic modeling, as exemplified by the McCubbins and Schwartz thesis, would
predict that Congress will retain or delegate power based on the political costs and
benefits. JOHN A. ROHR, CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONS 84-86 (2002).

67

BEERMANN-FINAL.DOC

4/20/2006 9:06 AM

appears that only the creativity of Congress limits the form of oversight
and control.
Congress’s involvement in the administration of the law takes place
both formally and informally.27 Formally, Congress attempts to control
the administration of the law legislatively, through devices as general as
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and as specific as legislation
enumerating with particularity the purposes for which appropriated
funds may or may not be spent and legislation approving particular
agency action during the pendency of judicial review litigation.
Informally, Congress uses the threat of legislative action, especially
relating to its power over the budget, to control or at least influence the
administration of the law in myriad ways, from insisting that the
President appoint particular candidates for executive positions to
pushing administrative action in the substantive direction favored by
members of Congress without the need to resort to the full legislative
process. Through its oversight and supervision of the administration of
the laws, Congress is involved in a great deal of the output of the
administrative state.
The consistent and constant involvement of Congress in the
administration of the laws has interesting ramifications for key features
of administrative law such as the nondelegation doctrine, which
regulates the amount of discretion Congress may delegate to an agency,
the Chevron doctrine, which specifies the standard for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation, and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, which
prohibits courts from imposing procedural requirements on agencies in
addition to those that are required by either the Constitution or
applicable statutes and rules. The lenient nondelegation doctrine, which
allows for the delegation of a great deal of discretion to agencies, is
consistent with a full appreciation of Congress’s role. As far as
deference to agency statutory interpretation is concerned, congressional
administration counsels in favor of a deferential version of Chevron in
those instances in which congressional involvement in agency
interpretation is likely. Finally, a broad application of the Vermont Yankee
doctrine to prohibit courts from imposing their own ideas of proper

27. For a collection of citations to the literature on congressional influence over
the administration of the law, most of which come from nonlegal publications, see
Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 755 n.135 (2005). For
a useful collection of essays on the relative roles of Congress and the President in
matters of public policy, see DIVIDED DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (James A. Thurber ed., 1991). See also Walter
Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513 app. at 562-66 (2000) (discussing oversight).
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procedures on agencies is consistent with Congress’s involvement in the
execution of the laws.
This Article is structured as follows. The first part of the Article is a
catalog of the ways that Congress is involved in the administration of the
law, formal and informal.28 Included in this part is some analysis of
whether Congress’s involvement is appropriate as a constitutional and
legal matter. The second part of the Article analyzes important doctrines
of administrative law in light of Congress’s involvement and asks
whether and to what extent any of these doctrines should be modified or
at least reconceptualized in that light. In particular, three pillars of
administrative law are examined—the nondelegation doctrine, the
Vermont Yankee doctrine and the Chevron doctrine.
I. CONGRESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAWS
The form of Congress’s involvement in the administration of the laws
ranges across a wide spectrum of formal and informal methods.29 On the
formal side, Congress employs its legislative power to map out its
preferred course of administrative action, and then it continually
supervises the executive branch through legislation and other formal
action.30 Some legislation is directed at particular agencies, and ranges
from directive provisions in enabling legislation to very specific
appropriations riders that prohibit or direct particular agency actions.
Other legislation, such as the APA and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), is more general and is designed to shape the
28. I have purposely omitted discussion of the war power. It is worth noting that
Louis Fisher believes that Congress has, in recent times, abdicated its historical position
of primacy in the decision whether to commit the armed forces of the United States to
foreign conflict. See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND
SPENDING (2000); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. rev. 2004). For an
analysis of Congress’s role in authorizing the war on terrorism, see Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2047 (2005).
29. For a comprehensive look at the relationship between Congress and the
President, see LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE (4th ed. 1998). See also THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL
RESTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981).
30. Of course, the President supervises Congress’s legislative actions through the
veto power, Article I, Section 7, and the Recommendations Clause, Article II, Section 3.
For an interesting discussion of the President’s involvement in the legislative process,
including an argument that Congress is constitutionally required to consider the President’s
recommendations, see Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2002).

69

BEERMANN-FINAL.DOC

4/20/2006 9:06 AM

conduct and policies of many agencies. In many cases, Congress enlists
the aid of the courts by prescribing judicial review under specified
standards. Although most formal congressional action is in the form of
legislation, the Senate’s power to reject executive appointments and the
impeachment and removal power of the House and Senate, respectively,
are additional formal tools that Congress employs to supervise the
executive branch.
In addition to formal supervision, Congress, or at least small groups
and individual members of Congress, supervise agencies informally.
Informal supervision also takes a variety of forms, including cajoling,
adverse publicity, audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding
missions, informal contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure
on the President to appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to
agency positions. All of the informal congressional action directed at
agencies takes place in the context of (often unspoken) threats that
Congress (or a particularly powerful member or committee) will not
cooperate with the executive branch in the future. Congress’s power
over all legislation including the annual budget, the power of
congressional committees to bottle up legislation, and the Senate’s
advice and consent power over appointments all create a strong incentive
for the President and the rest of the executive branch to keep Congress
happy. Thus, informal tools of supervision are often as powerful as
formal tools.31
Sometimes, it seems that members of Congress do not care much
about how the laws they have passed are executed, or at least they do not
care enough to react formally or informally to administrative action.32
Other times, Congress seems incredibly concerned, even obsessed, with
how its laws are administered. Perhaps Congress should care more
often, and it may be a major defect in our political system that Congress
can take credit with constituents for passing legislation and then sit by
idly while the executive branch fails to carry out its terms. Even worse,
Congress can interfere with the execution of the law to please a different
group of constituents. Overall, however, the level of oversight is high
enough that it is incorrect to assert that Congress abdicates its
responsibility when it delegates discretion to those administering the
law.
31. See generally Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91
J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
32. Over the years, there have been many attacks on delegation based upon the
political distortions that occur when Congress does not make the hard choices itself. A
good example is DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
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The remainder of this section describes and analyzes the principal
tools, both formal and informal, that Congress uses to supervise the
execution of the laws. These mechanisms are far from perfect if the
standard of perfection is ensuring implementation of programs in accord
with the intent of the legislative coalitions that enacted the programs.
Numerous principal-agent problems prevent Congress from ensuring
that agencies implement programs in accordance with congressional
desires. Further, once post-hoc supervision comes into play, the
difficulties may be magnified, with a new coalition or group within
Congress acting in accordance with aims that may be different from
those of the coalition that originally enacted the law being administered.33
Nonetheless, even though perfection may be unattainable, oversight of
agencies is important to Congress and constitutes a substantial part of
Congress’s work.
A. Formal Congressional Involvement in the Execution of the Laws
1. The Legislative Power
Congress’s most important formal method of influencing the
administration of the law is legislation, that is, by passing a bill through
both Houses of Congress and presenting it to the President for signature or
veto. Aside from a few constitutionally prescribed exceptions discussed
below, formal action by Congress has been limited by a number of
Supreme Court decisions in the past few decades to the legislative process,
including the invalidation of the legislative veto,34 the insistence that
officials under Congress’s formal supervision may not take part in the
execution of the laws35 and the invalidation of any attempt by members of
Congress to appoint the members of administrative agencies36 or to serve
on such agencies themselves.37
Put quite simply, Congress provides the laws to administer, and the
President’s primary power and duty is to faithfully execute those laws.
When Congress legislates with precision, the President and other
administrative officials may have little discretion in the execution of the
33. See generally McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 18.
34. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
35. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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law, especially if there are effective tools for enforcing Congress’s
expressed intent. Congress can also attempt, in the legislation creating
an agency or granting it the power to act, to “hard wire” the agency
through procedural and structural devices to make the agency more
likely to act in line with congressional preferences.38 If Congress is less
than precise, or if enforcement is not very strong, Congress may be
unable to exert much direct control over the administration of the law.
The legislative power gives Congress an enormous ability to control
the execution of the laws.39 The President’s power to execute the laws is
completely dependent on Congress passing laws to execute. There are,
no doubt, some areas in which the President has unreviewable authority,
such as decisions concerning the recognition of foreign governments.40
In most areas, however, the President and the entire executive branch are
highly dependent on legislation enabling them to carry out their
constitutionally assigned functions. As Judge Michael McConnell stated
recently in an opinion upholding very specific legislation aimed at
controlling the execution of the law:

38. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 673 (1992). This illustrates
a conceptual distinction in understanding congressional control of administrative action,
the distinction between ex ante and ex post controls. Ex ante controls, such as precise
statutory language and agency structure, attempt to control agency action in advance. Ex
post controls, such as statutory amendments and appropriations riders, attempt to control
agency action after the fact, when Congress notices that the agency has done something
it does not like. Hard wiring the agency, as Macey describes, is an example of an ex ante
control device.
39. Unlike other legislatures that are constitutionally barred from legislating
in certain areas of executive prerogative, or whose decisions may be
overridden by an executive veto or popular vote, Congress has a jurisdiction
that is virtually coterminous with that of the national government. Congress,
rather than the president or the voters, has the final say on public policy
questions.
Michael L. Mezey, Congress Within the U.S. Presidential System, in DIVIDED
DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 9,
23 (James A. Thurber ed., 1991).
40. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see also
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). However, Congress has been active in the
general field of foreign affairs. Thomas Franck interestingly ascribes congressional
activism in the international human rights field to the failure of the executive branch to
enforce the law. See Thomas M. Franck, Human Rights and Constitutional Wrongs: A
Case Study of the Origins of Congressional Imperialism, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY,
supra note 29, at 160-62. In another essay in the same collection, a foreign diplomat
complains that legislative oversight of the conduct of foreign affairs causes problems
because congressional meddling reduces the reliability of the executive branch. See Ivor
Richard, Foreign Perspective: With Whom Do You Deal? Whom Can You Trust?, in THE
TETHERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 29, at 21. The problem appears to arise from the lack
of a connection between the Cabinet and Congress.
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[W]hen Congress is exercising its own powers with respect to matters of public
right, the executive role of “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, is entirely derivative of the laws passed by Congress,
and Congress may be as specific in its instructions to the Executive as it
wishes.41

The language of the Constitution underscores the extent of congressional
superiority: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives.”42 The Constitution amplifies the legislative power
in incredibly broad terms. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants
Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”43 The analysis of this
clause has by and large focused on the meaning of “necessary and
proper,” with most scholars (and courts) adopting a very broad reading.44
I want to focus on the last part of the clause which grants Congress the
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out “all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” This language means
that in addition to legislation to carry out Congress’s enumerated
powers, Congress has the power to legislate on all matters properly
within the purview of the federal government, whether or not they are
listed as within the legislative power.45
41. Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration
in original).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
44. My colleague Gary Lawson is among the exceptions. He has consistently
argued for a narrow interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). I do not mean to enter
into the debate over the proper meaning of the clause, except to note that the courts have
by and large allowed Congress very wide latitude in the laws it enacts, perhaps with a bit
of tightening up in the last decade or so. One way in which the Supreme Court has
narrowed Congress’s power is by using the procedural device of requiring that Congress
make findings to justify its legislation. See Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731
(1996). In my view, this proceduralization of the analysis is not really genuine, but
rather designed to meet the criticism that the Court should not aggressively review the
substantive bases for congressional action.
45. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the
Judicial Branch, 1 BYU L. REV. 75 (1999).
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Just what does Congress’s ability to make law relating to powers
vested in other departments or officers entail? May Congress restrict the
exercise of powers vested in other officials, or does “carrying out” mean
that Congress may only enable other officials to carry out their
constitutionally assigned functions? For example, the prevailing
understanding is that Congress may not restrict the President’s
recognition of foreign governments because the power to receive
“Ambassadors and other public Ministers” is explicitly granted to the
President and is part of the President’s authority in foreign affairs, where
it is most important for the nation to speak with one voice. Congress
legislates in this area by providing funds for the conduct of foreign
affairs and by passing laws regarding the immunities and privileges of
foreign diplomats. Does Congress also have the power to limit the
President’s exercise of his constitutional powers on the theory that the
clause grants Congress the power to legislate even on matters vested by
the Constitution in other officers? Consider also legislation relating to
the judiciary. There has long been controversy over whether Congress
has the power to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The
most common argument in favor of Congress’s power is that the power
to restrict the courts’ jurisdiction is implicit in Congress’s complete
discretion over whether to create any lower federal courts at all. The
second half of the Necessary and Proper Clause adds another, perhaps
even stronger, argument that restricting the lower courts’ jurisdiction is
within Congress’s power to make laws relating to the powers vested by
the Constitution in the federal courts.
There are conflicting views regarding the scope of Congress’s power
over the other branches, particularly the executive branch, under the
second half of the Necessary and Proper Clause. William Van Alstyne
has taken a broad view of Congress’s power, concluding that except in
areas of constitutional necessity, the President and the federal courts are
highly dependent on Congress for their powers, even in sensitive areas
such as “confidentiality, removal, [and] remedy.”46 According to Van
Alstyne’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, “the absence of
affirmative action by Congress may defeat an assertion of ancillary
executive or judicial powers that cannot be defended as having been
expressly provided in articles II and III or as necessarily implied by the
nature of the expressed duties of those branches.”47

46. William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect
of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 118 (1976).
47. Id.

74

BEERMANN-FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 43: 61, 2006]

4/20/2006 9:06 AM

Congressional Administration
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

David Engdahl has argued for a more restrictive view of Congress’s
power, concluding that the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress power only to enable, but not to restrict, other branches
in the exercise of their constitutional powers:
With reference to the powers of another branch, however, whatever discretion
inheres in them belongs not to Congress but to that other branch, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause only empowers Congress to help effectuate the
discretion confided to that other branch. Although the decision whether and how
to render assistance is committed to Congress’ discretion, it is only assistance
that is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The words of this clause
are so perfectly adapted as to seem specifically tailored to exclude laws that
restrict or inhibit the constitutionally contemplated power (hence discretion) of
another branch.48

I do not find the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause as clear as
Engdahl does. Although Van Alstyne observes that a construction
allowing Congress only to enable the other branches is compatible with
the language of the clause, he does not reach a firm conclusion on
whether Congress has the additional power to restrict the other
branches.49 But Engdahl has gone much further, concluding that the
enabling only construction is almost compelled by the language. To the
contrary, when the Constitution grants Congress the power to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying out “all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof,” it is not linguistic nonsense to interpret
this language as granting Congress the power to decide what is
“necessary and proper” and what is not. A law may be necessary and
proper for carrying into the execution of a power granted to another
branch if it confines the other branch to exercising the power in a
manner consistent with legislatively expressed standards or procedures.50
Almost any legislation Congress might pass with regard to another
48. Engdahl, supra note 45, at 102 (second emphasis added).
49. See Van Alstyne, supra note 46, at 133 n.100. In my view, Van Alstyne’s
analysis and the sources he cites point toward the power to restrict. However, his main
focus is on the other branches’ need for enabling legislation from Congress, while
Engdahl focuses a bit more on the possibility of restrictive legislation.
50. This would be nonsense to Gary Lawson, who argues that the word “proper” in
the Necessary and Proper Clause requires Congress to respect background norms of
federalism and separation of powers. Among separation of powers norms at the
founding, according to Lawson, is a ban on congressional interference with the
performance by the other branches of their constitutionally assigned functions. See Gary
Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making,
18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 195-200 (2001).
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branch may include some restrictions or limitations, such as a
requirement that a particular agency employ a rulemaking or
adjudicatory procedure before issuing a rule or order or even that a
particular agency may issue only rules or only orders. Engdahl cites for
support of his conclusion the following language from an opinion of
Chief Justice John Marshall: “As Chief Justice Marshall said, Congress
may ‘exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into
execution the constitutional powers of the government.’”51 This
language does not answer whether the Court would strike down
Congress’s judgment if it embodied restrictions that are not contained in
the Constitution itself, for example by selecting some measures while
disallowing others or requiring that particular actions be done according
to prescribed procedures.
It is thus not a simple question whether Congress has the power to
place limitations on other branches in the exercise of their constitutional
powers. Consider the following example. The Constitution grants the
President the power to issue pardons. Assume that Congress authorizes
the position of “pardon attorney” in the Department of Justice and also
appropriates funds for the pardon process. So far so good, but suppose
also that the legislation requires the President to consult the pardon
attorney, and give her thirty days to render advice, before issuing a
pardon and that pardons issued in contravention of these requirements
are invalid. Then, on his last day in office, the outgoing President issues
several pardons that were never submitted to the pardon attorney. Are
these pardons valid?52 Most people’s reaction to this example is likely
to be in favor of the President’s power to disregard the restrictions
because the President is exercising a constitutional power, not a power
granted under a statute passed by Congress. That seems to be the best
reading of Supreme Court case law, but there are good arguments that
the Necessary and Proper Clause’s reference to other powers granted in
the Constitution gives Congress the power to place restrictions on the
exercise of the pardon power.53
51. Engdahl, supra note 45, at 102 n.103 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819)).
52. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 194-96 (2005) (discussing
congressional interference in the President’s pardon power).
53. The Supreme Court’s only decision directly on point struck down an effort by
Congress to interfere with the pardon power by converting a pardon from evidence of
loyalty during the Civil War to evidence of disloyalty. See United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. 128 (1871). The Court has also expressed its views on the pardon power in dicta,
usually recognizing expansive presidential power free from congressional interference.
See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). For a comprehensive study of
Congress’s role in the pardon power, see Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power
over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential
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Even if the Necessary and Proper Clause is read to grant Congress the
power to enable, but not restrict, other officers in the exercise of their
constitutional powers, Congress is likely to maintain some discretion
regarding how much to enable the other branches. For example,
Congress, perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the President’s conduct in
foreign affairs, may fail to afford foreign diplomats customary protections
or it may appropriate insufficient funds for the President to conduct the
diplomacy the President would prefer. Congress may similarly fail to
provide the federal courts with adequate resources and may refuse to
increase the number of judges when the workload indicates the need.
Insufficient enabling is unlikely to be viewed as unconstitutional, and
Congress’s legislative power, even if it is restricted by doctrines
prohibiting direct interference in the other branches’ activities, provides
Congress with significant supervisory authority. Neither the Constitution
nor Marshall’s language clearly states that Congress must enable the
other branches to exercise their powers to the fullest possible extent.
There is no question that in the foreign affairs area, Congress can have
a great deal of effect on the President’s conduct. Most directly, the
Senate can reject treaties agreed to by the President. Even if a treaty is
ratified, the Senate may attach conditions to the ratification to force
interpretation or application of the treaty in a particular direction.54
Further, a subsequent Congress can pass legislation that is inconsistent
with the treaty or that, in effect, prevents the President from carrying out
the treaty. While this legislation does not void the treaty, it can force the
United States into default on the treaty because the President is bound by
legislation that is inconsistent with treaty obligations.55
A key formal method Congress employs to control executive
discretion is to nip discretion in the bud by legislating with precision.
Under current law, Congress has a great deal of freedom over the degree
Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225 (2003). Peterson concludes that Congress
may not restrict the pardon power and probably cannot exercise the pardon power on its
own. In Peterson’s view, Congress has the power both to create the position of pardon
attorney and to regulate the conduct of the pardon attorney, but Congress may not
condition the President’s exercise of the pardon power on the observance of pardon
attorney procedures or any other statutory requirements, procedural or substantive.
54. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1228
n.191 (2004).
55. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
209-10 (2d ed. 1996); see also Jamil Jaffer, Comment, Congressional Control over
Treaty Interpretation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093 (2003) (describing efforts in Congress to
legislate the proper interpretation of a treaty).
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of precision in laws granting power to agencies, with somewhat less
freedom over the design of mechanisms it creates to control executive
discretion.56 There are few, if any, situations in which Congress’s
choice to be very precise concerning the substance of a regulatory
program would be subject to challenge on constitutional or other
grounds.57 On the other hand, lack of precision is often attacked as
violating the separation of powers by delegating legislative power to the
executive branch. Under the current, very lenient application of the
nondelegation doctrine, Congress must establish only an “intelligible
principle” to guide the exercise of executive discretion.58 Under the
intelligible principle standard, Congress can legislate its goals and the
broad contours of a regulatory program and leave it to the executive
branch to carry out the program. To some, this is unfortunate because it
allows Congress to evade its responsibility for the laws it passes and
allows Congress to be all things to all people, legislating in favor of one
interest while ensuring lax enforcement of another. To others, the
delegation of discretion to agencies is an inevitable and even desirable
response to the complexities and numbers of problems with which
government is confronted.
The lenient nondelegation doctrine, coupled with no significant
limitations on the degree of precision with which Congress legislates,
means that the output of Congress may sometimes be indistinguishable
from the output of an agency. For example, Congress may legislate
precise limits on the emission of pollutants from automobiles, or it may
set a goal of cleaner air and rely on an agency to establish the precise
limits. When a bill specifying the precise limits makes its way through
both Houses of Congress and is presented to the President, it is a proper
exercise of the legislative power. When the exact same text is published
56. Congress’s freedom over the degree of precision in the laws it passes derives
from the leniency of the nondelegation doctrine, which requires only that Congress
legislate an intelligible principle under which the administering agency must act. See
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) and infra text accompanying
note 58. The Court has strictly enforced structural provisions of the Constitution against
innovations such as the legislative veto and congressional attempts to vest execution of
the law in officials under congressional supervision. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). On the appointment and removal front,
the Court has been strict about not allowing Congress to be involved in the process, but
has allowed Congress to reduce the President’s authority by restricting removal and
placing appointive authority in hands other than the President’s. See Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (approving independent counsel appointed by a federal court and
subject to removal only by the Attorney General and only for good cause).
57. There are constraints where independent presidential powers are concerned such
as the President’s powers over foreign affairs, the pardon power, and the appointments
power. There may also be substantive constraints when Congress legislates to resolve an
issue that is the subject of litigation. This is discussed in detail below.
58. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472-74.
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in the Federal Register as a final rule after notice and comment, it is an
agency rule and a proper element of the execution of the law. To
advocates of a stricter nondelegation doctrine, this reveals the illogic of
the lenient nondelegation doctrine’s denial that Congress delegates
legislative power in these imprecise statutes. However, unless the
Supreme Court changes course, which it has declined to do in the face of
sustained attack for more than twenty years, the choice of the degree of
precision in regulatory statutes is largely for Congress to make.
There are general substantive doctrines that apply to all legislation that
may require some precision in regulatory statutes. Excessive vagueness
may violate due process by failing to give fair notice of legal
requirements or potential penalties when property or liberty interests are
threatened.59 However, there is no general constitutional requirement of
clarity in regulatory legislation that has any significant bite. In fact, the
D.C. Circuit’s recent unsuccessful attempted revival of the nondelegation
doctrine is best understood as an attempt to find a constitutional home
for a clarity requirement in administrative law which would require
agency decisions to be deduced from preexisting rules.
In its decision in the American Trucking case, the court of appeals
held that the nondelegation doctrine was violated, not by any lack of
clarity in the statute under which Congress granted the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) its authority to regulate air pollution, but
rather because the EPA could not explain its regulatory choice based on
a preexisting standard of its own. That is, the nondelegation doctrine
was violated due to a lack of clarity in underlying regulatory standards.60
This, to the court, meant that the agency’s discretion was unconstrained,
and constituted a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.61 The
Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’s attempt to import into the
nondelegation doctrine the requirement that agencies derive their rules
from preexisting standards on the simple basis that the nondelegation
doctrine regulates the clarity of Congress’s instructions to agencies and
not the clarity of the agency’s own standards from which it derives its
rules.62 The Court resoundingly reaffirmed that constitutional clarity

59. See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (“misconduct”
standard for disciplining university students too vague to satisfy due process).
60. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir 1999).
61. Id.
62. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472.
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concerns are met by statutes that contain an “intelligible principle” to
guide agency discretion and facilitate judicial review of agency action.63
When acting to enforce the law, the President’s authority to issue
orders directed to executive branch officials is often dependent, at least
partly, on legislative authority granted by Congress. Although they
often significantly affect the interests of nongovernmental parties,
Executive orders typically are directed at officials within the executive
branch while “proclamation” is the term used for presidential orders
directed at private parties.64 As a formal matter, the President has the
constitutional authority to issue such orders.65 However, the substance
of an Executive order must have a legal basis in one of the President’s
constitutionally based powers or from statutory authorization,66 and the
President may not contravene the law when issuing one.
In the most well-known Supreme Court decision involving an
Executive Order, the Supreme Court held that President Truman’s order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills
during a wartime labor dispute had no legal basis and was thus invalid.67
63. Id. There was an interesting point of disagreement among the Justices in the
Whitman case. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion presented the issue as whether Congress
had delegated legislative power to the EPA. Id. at 462. Justice Stevens, in a separate
opinion, argued that the Court should acknowledge that agency rulemaking authority is
delegated legislative power. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
The basis behind Justice Stevens’s argument is that “[t]he proper
characterization of governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the
power, not on the identity of the person exercising it.” Id. Justice Stevens is wrong for two
reasons. First, his implicit premise that Congress and the EPA would be performing the
same function if each wrote the same rule is incorrect. Agency rulemaking and legislation
are not the same function. When an agency makes rules, its power is limited by the terms
of a preexisting statute. Congress, by contrast, is not constrained by preexisting standards
except the limits established by the Constitution. Second, and more fundamentally, there
are many situations in which the characterization of a governmental power depends entirely
on the identity of the entity exercising the power. For example, when an agency grants an
alien the right to remain in the United States despite a finding for deportability, that is an
exercise of executive power that may be carried out only within the strictures put in place
by the law as enacted by Congress. However, when Congress passes a private bill to the
exact same effect, it exercises legislative power and therefore must follow the procedure for
passing a bill—bicameralism and presentment to the President—but Congress is not bound
by the terms of any preexisting statute. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-54 & n.16
(1983).
64. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 155 (1999):
[The] term [Executive order] is often reserved for orders directed at
subordinates within the executive branch []since the latter are the ones who
actually carry out government policy . . . . Presidents have also acted, however,
through proclamations, a term that has traditionally (but not always) been used
when the order is aimed at citizens rather than government employees.
65. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 551 (2005)
66. See id. at 550.
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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In this case, Justice Jackson wrote his famous concurring opinion in
which he divided presidential actions into three categories: those in
which the President acts with congressional authorization, those in
which the President acts in the face of a congressional prohibition and
those in which the President acts without authorization but not against a
prohibition.68 Justice Jackson argued that there is room for the President
to act without authorization, but his analysis was not very specific or
satisfying. Here is what Justice Jackson wrote:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.69

The emphasized part of Justice Jackson’s opinion implies that when
there is an absence of statutory law governing the President’s conduct,
practicalities rather than law should determine the legality of the
President’s conduct. The majority was more focused on law, looking for
congressional authorization for the President’s action in seizing the steel
mills. The majority found that the President had essentially usurped the
legislative function by taking significant action without congressional
authorization. To the majority, the lack of authorization rendered the
President’s actions illegal. Justice Jackson placed much less stress on
the lack of authorization from Congress than the majority did, at least in
the particular context of the case. To Justice Jackson, “imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables” might justify presidential
action in the absence of authorization. Jackson found, however, that the
President’s action of seizing the steel mills was in his third category,
prohibited by congressional action. While the President was not
statutorily prohibited from seizing the steel mills in so many words,
Justice Jackson inferred the prohibition by negative implication from the
existence of congressional authorization to seize private businesses in
other circumstances and with other procedures. Placing the seizure in
the category of actions prohibited by Congress, he found lacking any

68.
69.

Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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independent presidential authority to act, and thus agreed with the Court
that the President’s order was unlawful.70
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated
an Executive order that it found contrary to law.71 President Clinton’s
Executive Order 12,594, purportedly issued under federal procurement
legislation, prohibited the federal government from purchasing goods
and services from companies that had hired permanent replacements for
their striking workers.72 The court held the President’s order unlawful
because it was contrary to a provision of federal labor law that
guarantees employers the right to permanently replace their striking
employees.73 The court brushed aside challenges to its authority to hear
the case, holding that Executive orders are subject to “nonstatutory”
judicial review under the pre-APA doctrine of judicial declaration of
executive actions as “ultra-vires,” even if the APA does not subject
Executive orders to judicial review.74 Thus, Executive orders are subject
to review for compliance with statutory provisions.75
In addition to the possibility of judicial review for compliance with
preexisting statutes, Congress often legislates specifically to direct,
override or prevent particular administrative action. As long as required
legislative procedures are employed, specific substantive restrictions on
executive action do not transgress separation of powers or other
constitutional limits on legislative action and in fact are desirable
because they maximize democratic input into important policy decisions.
While Congress does not legislatively override particular agency action
very often, especially when compared to the volume of administrative

70. Id. at 640-56 (majority opinion).
71. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
72. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995).
73. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336-38.
74. Id. at 1326-28. The President is not an “agency” under the APA and thus
presidential actions are not subject to APA judicial review. See Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
75. If the President is careful in drafting Executive orders, the possibility of
illegality can be avoided. President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13,202
instructed federal agencies not to require or prohibit a certain kind of labor contract in
federally funded projects under their jurisdiction. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 3 C.F.R. 759
(2002), reprinted in U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. II 2002). In Building and Construction Trades
Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the order was challenged on
the ground that some statutes required or permitted the particular form of labor
agreement in federal projects. Because the order required action only “to the extent
permitted by law,” the court held that the order was not contrary to law. Id. at 29. Under
this language, if the order was contrary to the particular statute administered by an
official, the official was instructed by the order itself to follow the statute. Similarly,
President Reagan’s landmark Executive Order 12,291 required agencies to engage in
cost-benefit analysis only to the extent permitted by law. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982).
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action that receives no apparent attention from Congress, when it does
happen, it places Congress in a strong supervisory role over the
administration of the law.
Congress has the power to legislatively reject particular administrative
action without changing the underlying substantive law.76 Before 1983,
Congress overrode particular agency decisions pursuant to legislative
veto provisions. After the legislative veto was declared unconstitutional,
Congress eventually established a formal legislative method of reviewing
major administrative rules.77 Under this statute, the Congressional
Review Act (CRA),78 before any administrative rule can go into effect,
the promulgating agency must submit a report containing the text of the
rule and the rule’s concise general statement of basis and purpose to
each House of Congress and the Comptroller General. The report must
also include any cost-benefit analysis prepared regarding the rule and
various other compliance documents required by other statutes. With
regard to major rules, the effective date of the rule must be at least sixty
days after Congress receives the report. Under this process, Congress
may legislatively reject rules within a specified period of time.79 While
the constitutional requirements for legislating are not affected by this
procedure, the statute eases Congress’s own rules (although the statute
recognizes the right of each House to apply different rules80), making it
76. There may be some limits to Congress’s power to overrule agency actions in
adjudication based on due process and related concerns. However, Congress’s power is
not limited to general rules. Courts have approved legislation regarding agency action
with significant effects on particular parties even while judicial review is pending. See
infra notes 142-153 and accompanying text.
77. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. III 1994).
78. See id.
79. Under current law, if Congress does not act, the administrative rules go into
effect after a specified period of time. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3). Conceivably, Congress
could statutorily provide that rules do not go into effect unless Congress passes
legislation approving them. 5 U.S.C. § 801. While this would maintain an even greater
degree of control in Congress, Congress is unlikely to adopt such a procedure because of
the volume of rules it would be forced to act upon and because then Congress would be
politically responsible for all rules adopted through the procedure.
80. See 5 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. III 1994). This means that the statute is “essentially
hortatory or directory” because each House is free not to employ the expedited procedure.
See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 428 (2004). Vermeule opines that although it may be unconstitutional, Congress
should have the power to establish binding rules of congressional procedure. Id. at 430; see
also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of the Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345
(2003) (arguing that binding statutory rules of congressional procedure are
constitutionally suspect); Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional
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easier for the rejection legislation to make it to the floor of each House
of Congress for votes. Substantively, the CRA is unnecessary because
Congress always had the power to legislatively override agency rules.
The main innovations of the CRA are procedural, primarily consisting of
the advance notice to Congress of proposed rules and the expedited
procedure for a resolution disapproving an agency rule to reach the floor
of each House of Congress for a vote. This procedure has been used
only once,81 but the threat of such action may influence the content of
administrative rules. By enacting this statute, Congress has taken
responsibility for supervising agency rulemaking and, in a sense, is
lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule under the
procedure.
2. The Power of the Purse, Appropriations Riders, and Earmarking
The fact that the nondelegation doctrine does not require Congress to
be very specific when it empowers agencies does not mean that
Congress is forbidden or should even be discouraged from being very
specific when it wants to be. One way in which Congress has supervised
agencies with great particularity, both formally and informally,82 is
through the appropriations process.83 The power of the purse is among
Congress’s most potent weapons in its effort to control the execution of
the laws.84 The other branches of government are completely dependent
on Congress for funding.85 The Appropriations Clause provides: “No
Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1 (2004)
(agreeing that entrenched laws are unconstitutional but defending entrenched Senate
rules for ending debate).
81. See Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (joint resolution disapproving
Department of Labor’s Ergonomics Rule).
82. Informal supervision through the appropriations process is discussed infra at p.
62.
83. See generally HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77-83 (2005)
(discussing strength of and limits on Congress’s power over appropriations).
84. For an argument that Congress has not adequately supervised the budget
process, see FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING, supra note
28. For a reply, denying that Congress has abdicated its responsibility for the budget, see
Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 65 (2000). See also D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
167-85 (1991) (concluding that Congress, through parties and committees, supervises the
appropriations process more than the critics contend). For an interesting general look at
how the congressional budget procedures affect the balance of power in the
appropriations process, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process:
Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (2000).
85. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833 (1994). The Constitution might require
Congress to fund the core functions of the other branches such as providing enough
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money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.”86 “Appropriations made by law” means
appropriations made through the legislative process—bills that pass both
Houses of Congress and are presented to the President.87
As a political matter, Congress’s power over the budget has been
somewhat diminished since the passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921.88 That statute enhanced the President’s power within the
budget process by unifying the process of preparing the annual budget
and professionalizing the President’s budget staff.89 However, as a
formal matter, Congress retains the power of the purse, and it has used
that power to influence if not control the administration of the law. As a
practical matter, in a disagreement between Congress and the President
over the priorities or the value of a particular program, Congress will
win if it uses its power over the allocation of funds.
In addition to simply appropriating more money for favored programs
and less (or no) funds for disfavored programs, Congress has used what
are known as appropriations riders to supervise the execution of the laws
in a very direct and particularized way. Appropriations riders are used by
Congress across a broad spectrum of substantive areas to supervise the
activities of federal agencies. Appropriations riders typically single out
a specific regulatory activity and prohibit the expenditure of funds for
carrying out that regulatory activity or plan. For example, early on in his
presidency, President Bill Clinton made ergonomics regulation a priority
for his administration. For several years, however, Congress prevented
the OSHA from issuing regulations with provisions in appropriations
bills like the following:

funding for the Supreme Court to function and for the President to review legislation and
to exercise his powers such as the pardon power and the power over foreign affairs.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
87. Congress has statutorily prohibited agencies from getting around limits on their
appropriations by raising and spending their own funds. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000).
Agencies are also statutorily prohibited from spending more than what has been
appropriated. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
88. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
89. See KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 84, at 166 (quoting JAMES PFIFFNER,
THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS: IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET ACT
15 (1979) (“[T]he creation of the Budget Bureau marks the ‘beginning of the domination
of the budgetary process by the institutionalized presidency.’”)); Alan L. Feld,
Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REV. 171, 188
(1986).
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None of the funds made available in this Act may be used by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration directly or through section 23(g) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to promulgate or issue any proposed or
final standard or guideline regarding ergonomic protection. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration from conducting any peer reviewed risk assessment activity
regarding ergonomics, including conducting peer reviews of the scientific basis
for establishing any standard or guideline, direct or contracted research, or other
activity necessary to fully establish the scientific basis for promulgating any
standard or guideline on ergonomic protection.90

There are many more examples of appropriations riders. For example,
in the 1980s, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
was considering abandoning its longstanding broadcast licensing
preferences for women and minorities, Congress added riders to the
FCC’s appropriations bills prohibiting the expenditure of FCC funds to
reexamine or reverse these preferences.91
Another striking example of the use of the rider to influence the
execution of the law is a series of riders in the 1980s barring the
executive branch from taking any action to change the per se rule in
antitrust law that prohibits resale price maintenance agreements.92 As J.
Gregory Sidak reports, this rider prevented the Department of Justice
from presenting an oral argument in support of a legal position it had
taken in an amicus curiae brief it had filed in a pending case.93 Sidak
calls riders like this one “muzzling” riders because they prevent the
President and the executive branch as a whole from advocating for
changes in law or policy, and he argues that they may violate the
Recommendations Clause of the Constitution which requires the
President to “give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,
and recommend . . . such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient.”94 Whether constitutional or not, this use of the rider
dramatically illustrates how the power of the purse allows Congress to
90. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-34, § 102, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
91. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead?
Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 685, 715 n.164 (1991) (citing Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-1, 1329-31
(1987)).
92. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983),
cited in J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080 n.6
(1989); see also Act of Sept. 30, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 605, 101 Stat. 1329-1,
1329-38, discussed in Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures,
Total Welfare, and the Challenge of IntraMarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 849, 915 n.176 (2000); Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 605, 100 Stat.
1783, 1783-73; § 510, 97 Stat. at 1102-03.
93. See Sidak, supra note 92, at 2080.
94. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 3.
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control important aspects of the execution of the law in ways that appear
to impinge on the discretion of executive branch officials.
Riders often function as temporary, narrowly focused amendments to
the underlying statute. For example, Congress has used appropriations
riders to hinder the listing of a species as endangered even if all of the
statutory requirements for listing are met.95 The effect of such a rider is
to exempt the particular species from coverage for the duration of the
rider. The rider legally supersedes the provisions of the general statutes
referred to in the rider. A rider is more effective than the simple failure
to appropriate funds for a particular action or program because agencies
are often able to reallocate appropriated funds among various
programs.96
The legal effect of an appropriations rider is illustrated very clearly by
a dispute over a government program that made its way to the Supreme
Court a few years ago. Under federal law,97 convicted felons are prohibited
from owning or possessing firearms. A felony conviction in Mexico (for
illegally, although possibly accidentally, importing ammunition into Mexico)
made it impossible for Thomas Bean to continue in his profession as a
firearms dealer.98 A provision of the federal law at issue, however,
allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to restore a convicted felon’s right
to own or possess firearms if the Secretary found that “the applicant will
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”99
Bean applied for this relief, but the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF), to which the Secretary had delegated his authority to
act, returned the application without acting on it because Congress had,
since 1992, attached riders to the Treasury Department’s appropriations
bills prohibiting the Department from using any of its funds to act on
95. See Jason M. Patlis, Riders on the Storm, or Navigating the Crosswinds of
Appropriations and Administration of the Endangered Species Act: A Play in Five Acts,
16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2003).
96. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (agency decision to reallocate sums
included in a lump sum appropriation is exempt from judicial review). Reallocation in the
face of objections from members of Congress may be difficult due to informal supervision
from the appropriations committees. See infra text accompanying notes 369370.
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(2000). The description of the statutory scheme and
the case decided under it are from United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002).
98. Bean, 537 U.S. at 72-73.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000). The current version of the statute provides that the
Attorney General, rather than the Secretary of the Treasury, may grant relief. See 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) (Supp. II 2003).
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applications for relief from federal firearms restrictions. Bean then
sought judicial review, characterizing the ATF’s refusal to act on and the
return of his application as a denial of the application subject to judicial
review.100 The Supreme Court rejected Bean’s argument, holding that
judicial review is available only after the ATF has actually made a
decision on the merits of an application for relief.101 Because the
appropriations rider prevented the ATF from acting on the merits of any
applications, Bean could not get judicial review of what, in effect, was a
denial of his application. The appropriations rider prevented the
Treasury Department from executing the substantive provisions of the
statute, demonstrating Congress’s ability legislatively to control the
execution of the law.
The use of appropriations riders is controversial for a number of
reasons. Steve Calabresi characterizes appropriations riders as Congress
using its “power of the purse to affect directly the President’s exercise of
what would otherwise appear to be his core executive powers.”102 For
one, the placement of a rider in an appropriations bill makes it difficult
for the President to veto it because he would have to veto an entire
appropriations bill.103 Another criticism of the use of riders is that they
often fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected
members of Congress and voted on by members who may not even be
aware of their presence in the bill. Even if they are aware of the riders,
members face a great deal of pressure to vote in favor of the bill and
may be unable to get serious consideration of an amendment to remove
the rider.104 Riders are thus viewed in some circles as a method for
100. On the merits, Bean had a decent case for relief since he might have been able
to prove that the violation was accidental and that he had an otherwise unblemished
record.
101. Bean, 537 U.S. at 75-76.
102. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 53 (1995).
103. This is Farber and Frickey’s explanation for why Congress used appropriations
riders rather than passing substantive legislation to prevent the FCC from revising its
affirmative action policies. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 91, at 714-15.
104. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 52-57 (1993).
Schoenbrod illustrates the problems with riders with the example of administrative and
legislative activity designed to keep the price of oranges high. According to Schoenbrod,
when the Department of Agriculture threatened to take steps that would reduce the
largest grower’s grip on the market, Congress used a combination of appropriations
riders and other pressure to prevent changes to the status quo. One interesting rider
prohibited the Department from using its funds to provide the public with information
about growers. The Department interpreted this rider to forbid it from complying with
requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act even if the requester was
willing to bear all the costs of obtaining the information. A court rejected this
interpretation. See Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992), cited in
SCHOENBROD, supra note 32, at 218 n.54; see also City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 384 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2004) (rider prohibiting the expenditure of funds to
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Congress to dodge responsibility for its legislative actions.105
Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, the rider is an effective method for
supervision by Congress of the execution of the laws.106
Congress also earmarks funds in a manner that may be considered the
converse of riders, appropriating funds for very particular purposes or
programs and sidestepping agency discretion. Earmarked spending is a
type of congressional administration because it often runs parallel to an
agency program. In the area of endangered species, for example,
Congress has mandated that funds be spent to take steps to protect
species that the administering agency would not have taken under its
usual standards.107 At the same time that Congress funds large granting
agencies like the National Science Foundation to enable the agency to
distribute federal funds for scientific research under statutory and
administrative standards, Congress appropriates funds for particular
research projects that may or may not meet the usual, scientifically

release certain firearms data does not prohibit Treasury Department from releasing
firearms data in response to FOIA request). However, when the rider was augmented
with language stating that the information in question is “immune from legal process and
shall not be subject to subpoena or other discovery in any civil action in a State or
Federal court,” see Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859-60 (2004), (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 923), the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and held, en banc, that the
Treasury Department may not release the data pursuant to a FOIA request. See City of
Chicago v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005).
105. See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 995-96
(2000) (suggesting that if the nondelegation doctrine were strengthened, Congress would
use appropriations riders as one method of avoiding accountability); Neal E. Devins,
Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; see
also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988
Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389 (criticizing secretive nondeliberative process
for passing continuing resolutions). For these reasons, there is a mythic rule that
appropriations provisions are not supposed to change substantive law. The rule is a myth
because, as we have seen, riders are used all the time to change the law.
106. The Supreme Court has treated appropriations riders with the same respect it
affords to legislation in other forms. For example, congressional approval in the form of
appropriations riders prohibiting the FCC from changing its affirmative action policies
was one factor the Court relied upon when it upheld those policies against constitutional
challenges. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572 (1990).
107. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1477 & n.124 (2003) (describing how practice
of earmarking funds for the protection of particular species avoids the usual discretion of
the Fish and Wildlife Service to decide how best to allocate resources for species
protection).
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accepted, standards.108 Often, earmarked appropriations are a type of pork
barrel legislation in which powerful legislators procure funds for
research or projects that benefit businesses or educational institutions in
their districts.109 Earmarked appropriations are problematic when they
fund unnecessary programs or are inconsistent with rational priorities for
spending limited funds. They are also a good example of the lack of
fiscal discipline in Congress. However, they are well within Congress’s
constitutional power.

108. See Donald N. Langenberg, Earmarked Appropriations: The Debate Over the
Method of Federal Funding, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1029 (1987). A good example of
this is research into the usefulness for military purposes of chewing gum with nicotine
made by a company located in the district of the Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert.
See Ceci Connolly & Juliet Eilperin, Hastert Steps Up to Leading Role, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 1999, at A1.
109. An infamous recent example is the $450 million earmarked to build two
bridges in Alaska that went nowhere. See Matt Volz, Alaska Wants to Fix Image;
Governor Fears State Is Perceived as a Greedy Place, COLUMBIAN (Wash.), Feb. 14,
2006, at D9, available at 2006 WLNR 2810225 (discussing two “bridges to nowhere”).
The use, and expense, of earmarks has grown dramatically in the past ten years. See
Susan Milligan, Congressional Pet Projects Boom in Secret: Lobbyist with Hill Ties Key
to Record Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1. Because of the effect they
have on the federal budget deficit, earmarks have become a hot issue and various
reforms have been proposed to make it more difficult to insert earmarks into legislation.
See Peter Cohn, Panel Closing Ranks on Earmarks Plan, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 10,
2006, 2006 WLNR 2376809. Some members of Congress defend earmarking as
something they do only because their constituents would suffer if they stopped doing it
when everyone else does, or as necessary to help constituents ignored by federal
agencies. See Milligan, supra (quoting Representative John Tierney); FDCH Capital
Transcripts, Jan. 18, 2006, 2006 WLNR 975075 (quoting Senator Trent Lott at a news
conference):
I’ve been involved in earmarking for my state. My state has been one of the
poorest states in the nation . . . . We don’t have adequate roads, we don’t have
adequate schools, we don’t have adequate housing.
....
I’ve been trying to get the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
help the poor little town of Tchula, Mississippi for four years.
....
Everything that they’ve gotten Senator Cochran and I did with line items.
Id.; see John Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T. Alter, Clear and Convincing to Whom?
The False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Standard: Why the Government Needs a
Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1451-60 (2000) (describing earmarked
appropriations for military projects that were not requested by the Department of
Defense, and were militarily unnecessary, but would benefit a large contractor
headquartered in the district of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich).
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3. Private Bills
Private bills are another way that Congress remains involved in what
appears to be the execution of the law.110 A private bill is a legislative
measure, usually to grant a benefit to a single party, that is published in
the Statutes at Large but not as a public law.111 The process for passing
a private bill is the same as the procedure used for public laws, including
passage through both Houses of Congress and presentment to the
President. Congress has used private bills in a variety of contexts, some
of which resemble the activity of administrative agencies, including
awarding pensions to war veterans112 and granting particular aliens
permanent residency despite legal deportability.113 Any attempt to use a
private bill to punish a particular person would raise constitutional
concerns under the Due Process and Bill of Attainder clauses, and some
of the historical uses of private bills, such as private bills waiving res
judicata in private litigation, raise constitutional issues today that may
not have been recognized earlier.114
110. Thanks to my colleague Wendy Gordon for drawing my attention to the
relevance of private bills to this project.
111. For a general discussion of private bills, see Note, Private Bills in Congress,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966).
112. The history of awarding war pensions through private bills dates all the way
back to pensions for veterans of the Revolutionary War. Recall the famous Hayburn’s
Case from 1792 in which federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices) addressed
whether it was consistent with their status as federal judges to hear petitions for war
pensions when their decision resulted not in a final judgment but rather in a
recommendation to the Secretary of War and ultimately to Congress. Hayburn’s Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Interestingly, the judges who expressed their views on the
matter in Hayburn’s Case did not identify any constitutional problem with Congress
deciding individual pensions legislatively. Rather, the constitutional issue identified was
that issuing nonfinal judgments was beyond the judicial power and thus the judges could
not act on the petitions, at least not in their judicial capacity. Some of the judges agreed
to hear the petitions as extrajudicial commissioners.
113. There is a long history of Congress reserving to itself the decision whether a
particular deportable alien should be allowed to stay in the United States. As the history
recounted in the Chadha opinion illustrates, even though Congress was apparently
suffering under a heavy load of private immigration bills, the legislative veto was
included in the immigration provision at issue in Chadha because Congress was
unwilling to surrender the power to suspend deportation to the Department of Justice.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
114. Under current law, a private bill reopening litigation might violate the
defendant’s due process property rights, especially if the case had already been litigated
to judgment. However, in a very early case, the Supreme Court found no constitutional
problem when a state legislature ordered a new trial in a pending civil action. See Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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In the immigration context, the private bill process illustrates
cooperation between the executive branch and Congress in the execution of
the law. Congress and the agency administering the deportation process
apparently have agreed to delay deportation while Congress considers a
private bill.115 The rules of the House Judiciary Committee on private
immigration bills, administered by a subcommittee, explain the process:
5. The Subcommittee may, at a formal meeting, entertain a motion to request
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service provide the Subcommittee with
a departmental report on a beneficiary of a private bill. In the past, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service has honored requests for departmental
reports by staying deportation until final action is taken on the private bill.
Only those cases designed to prevent extreme hardship to the beneficiary or a
U.S. citizen spouse, parent, or child will merit a request for a report.116

Thus, the actions of a single subcommittee result in a stay of deportation,
albeit via an informal agreement between Congress and the agency.
When Congress decides that a particular alien should be allowed to
remain in the United States or that a particular war veteran should
receive compensation or a pension,117 this action, though legislative in
form, resembles the administration of the law. It is certainly action that
could have been taken by an agency under standards prescribed by
Congress. In fact, in some cases, private bills directly overturn the
results of administrative processes, although this is a use of the private
bill that apparently invites a presidential veto.118 While there is no
constitutional impediment to Congress legislating in this manner,
problems with the private bill process have been recognized. For
example, although private bills almost by definition raise no important
social or legal issue, presidents have vetoed private bills on at least two
interesting grounds—first, that they are discriminatory when they single
out particular parties for a benefit not available to others and, second,

115. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, Rules of
Procedure and Statement of Policy for Private Immigration Bills, H. 522-3 § 5, 107th
Cong. (2002) microformed on No. 02-H522-3 (Cong. Info. Serv.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/privimmpro.pdf.
116.
Id. The rules of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and
Citizenship similarly state: “1. The introduction of a private bill does not act as a stay of
deportation until the committee requests a departmental report.” S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Rules of Procedure (Private
Legislation), S. 522-1, 100th Cong. § 1 (1987) microformed on CIS No. 87-S522-1
(Cong. Info. Serv.).
117. Carmel Sileo, Gulf War POWs Can’t Get Satisfaction, TRIAL, Feb. 2004, at 74-75
(“A similar suit filed by former civilian hostages−the infamous ‘human shields’ who were
also held during the Gulf War−was settled two years ago, and that judgment was paid out of
the same now-disputed Iraqi funds, through private bills passed in Congress. (Hill v. Republic
of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001)).”).
118. See Note, supra note 111, at 1702.

92

BEERMANN-FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 43: 61, 2006]

4/20/2006 9:06 AM

Congressional Administration
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that they can be inconsistent with a general legislative plan when they
grant relief from the provisions of a public law.119
4. Legislation During the Pendency of Judicial Review
Another method of supervising agencies, analogous to the
appropriations rider because of its specificity, is legislation during the
pendency of judicial review. In an apparent effort to influence the
outcome of the judicial review proceeding or perhaps even to short
circuit it altogether, Congress sometimes legislates with great
particularity regarding administrative action even while judicial review
is pending. This practice raises separation of powers concerns, not only
with regard to the power of the executive branch but also with regard to
the judicial branch. On the one hand, Congress may not directly interfere
with ongoing litigation by ordering a court of law to take a particular
action in a pending case. On the other hand, Congress may change the
law while litigation is pending, and courts will generally follow the law
as amended.
The distinction between congressional interference with ongoing
litigation and legislation that changes underlying law is not terribly
clear. The best relatively recent illustration of this difficulty is a case
arising out of a controversy regarding logging on federal land in old
growth forests in the Pacific Northwest that are habitat for an
endangered species of owl.120 The controversy over timber cutting
reached the courts after the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of the Interior approved sales of timber
in the old growth forests.121 Environmental groups and logging interests
challenged the logging plans, with environmental groups claiming too
much logging was allowed and loggers claiming too little was
allowed.122 After a variety of judicial proceedings in two federal district
courts, Congress intervened into the controversy by passing a
comprehensive plan for timber sales in the area for fiscal year 1990 as
section 318 of the Department of Interior annual appropriations bill.123
The statute mandated a certain level of timber sales, but, to protect the
119. See id. at 1702.
120. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
121. Id. at 431.
122. Id. at 432-37.
123. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989).
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spotted owl, placed new restrictions and requirements on the sales.124 It
stated that no sales of timber could occur in areas identified in the Forest
Service’s 1988 environmental impact statement, with some congressional
adjustments,125 and prohibited sales in 110 areas that had been identified
in an agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.126 In effect, the statute
constituted congressional approval of a great deal of what the agencies
had previously done. Subsection (b)(6)(a) dealt specifically with the
ongoing litigation concerning spotted owl protection:
Without passing on the legal and factual adequacy of the Final Supplement to the
Environmental Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest
Regional Guide—Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of
Decision issued by the Forest Service on December 8, 1988 or the December 22,
1987 agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife for management of the Spotted Owl, the
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in
Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western
Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the
consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson,
Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale
Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case
Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR. The
guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be
subject to judicial review by any court of the United States.127

The environmentalist plaintiffs in the ongoing spotted owl litigation
challenged section 318 on the ground that it interfered with the judicial
function by directing the outcome of a case pending in the federal
courts.128 Under the plaintiffs’ (and the court of appeals’) interpretation
of the statute, Congress had directed the federal courts to hold that
section 318’s provisions satisfied the statutes under which the plaintiffs
were challenging the sales, namely NEPA, the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the
Oregon-California Land Grant Act (OCLA).129 Under the plaintiffs’
argument, section 318 did not amend any of the statutes under which
they were challenging the sales but rather mandated a particular

124. See id. § 318(a).
125. See id. § 318(b)(3).
126. See id. § 318(b)(5).
127. Id. § 318 (b)(6)(A).
128. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1992).
129. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d,
503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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interpretation of those statutes in pending litigation, violating Article III
principles.130
For their challenge, the plaintiffs relied on United States v. Klein,131 a
Civil War era decision that invalidated a statute on the ground that it,
inter alia, “prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way.”132 Before Klein, the Supreme Court had decided that a presidential
pardon would make a claimant entitled to the return of property seized
during the Civil War because, according to the Court, a pardon was
sufficient evidence of loyalty to warrant return of captured property
under relevant statutes.133 Klein received a presidential pardon and then
brought a claim for the value of his captured property to the Court of
Claims.134 After the Court of Claims ruled in Klein’s favor, the United
States appealed.135 In the meantime, Congress passed a statute providing
that when a pardon stated that the person pardoned had aided the
rebellion, and the pardon was accepted without a disclaimer, the pardon
should be considered “as conclusive evidence in the Court of Claims,
and on appeal, that the claimant did give aid to the rebellion; and on
proof of such pardon . . . the jurisdiction of the court shall cease, and the
suit shall be forthwith dismissed.”136 Under the statute, then, the Supreme
Court would have been required to hold that the pardon was evidence of
disloyalty and Klein’s case should have been dismissed.
The argument in favor of upholding the statute in Klein (and in the
spotted owl litigation) was provided by the Court’s earlier decision in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.137 In Wheeling Bridge,
after the Supreme Court declared that a bridge constructed under state
authority was a nuisance138 because it interfered with navigation on a
navigable river and thus interfered with Congress’s commerce power,
Congress passed a statute declaring the bridge a “lawful structure” and
making the bridge a post road.139 The Supreme Court, on a motion to
130. Id. at 1313, 1316; Robertson, 503 U.S. at 439-40.
131. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
132. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146. It is also possible to read Klein much differently, as
holding that Congress was interfering unconstitutionally with the pardon power.
133. Id. at 131-32.
134. Id. at 132.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added).
137. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856).
138. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852).
139. Id.
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enforce the injunction granted pursuant to the earlier nuisance ruling,
held that the new legislation superseded its prior ruling and that the
bridge was therefore no longer a nuisance.140 The Klein Court
distinguished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that, in Wheeling Bridge,
the law had been changed, while in Klein, Congress had merely
instructed the Court on how to treat a particular piece of evidence
without changing the underlying legal norms.141
The Robertson Court carried forward this distinction between
Wheeling Bridge and Klein and presented the key issue in the case as
whether Congress had changed the law (which would be constitutional)
or directed court action in a particular case in a particular direction
(which would be unconstitutional).142 The Court concluded that section
318 changed the law rather than merely directed the outcome of the
Robertson litigation, and therefore did not violate the principles underlying
Klein.143 In rejecting the argument that the statutory reference to the
district court case names and numbers established that Congress had
intervened into ongoing litigation, the Court adopted the government’s
position that Congress mentioned the pending litigation only to identify
the statutes that section 318 was deemed to satisfy.144
The Court’s decision recognizes broad authority in Congress to make
very particular changes to the law in its supervisory role over federal

140. Id.
141. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47.
142. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
143. The Court acknowledged that section 318 did not partially repeal the statutes
that were the basis of the challenges to the sales, but the Court held that Congress had
deemed that the new requirements of section 318 met the requirements of the other
statutes. See id. at 439-41. This does not literally mean that Congress was of the opinion
that in this particular instance the provisions of section 318 satisfied the requirements of
the other statutes, hence the proviso that Congress was not passing on:
[T]he legal and factual adequacy of the Final Supplement to the Environmental
Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional
Guide−Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of Decision
issued by the Forest Service on December 8, 1988 or the December 22, 1987
agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife for management of the Spotted Owl.
Id. at 435 n.2. Rather, Congress was legislating that section 318’s standards should
govern the particular situation. This practice of “deeming” one statute to comply with
another, for example deeming that the plan for the spotted owl satisfied NEPA, tempers
the effect of generally applicable statutes like NEPA when adherence would be
politically unacceptable.
144. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 440. For an argument that Robertson and Klein are
inconsistent, see Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress
Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society
and the Federal Appellate Courts’ Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to
the New Section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1054-55
(1993).
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agencies.145 The Court does not require Congress to adopt general rules
to govern future agency action. As applied to other agency action, the
requirements of the five statutes at issue in Robertson are no different
after section 318 than they were before it. What Congress actually did
was exempt timber sales pursuant to section 318 from the requirements
of the five statutes and make that exemption apply retroactively in
pending litigation.
There are additional examples of particularized congressional intervention
into the administration of the laws during the pendency of judicial
review, in which Congress directs an executive official to grant an
approval that would otherwise be discretionary with an agency official
or Cabinet secretary.146 In one statute, Congress directed the Secretary
145. More recently, Congress passed a statute regulating logging in part of the
Black Hills National Forest. The statute required the Forest Service to violate the terms
of a federal court-approved settlement agreement. This statute was challenged on the
grounds that it usurped the authority of both the executive branch and the federal courts.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge, stating that its conclusion followed a fortiori
from Robertson. See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir.
2004).
146. Congress has also, on occasion, attempted to influence the outcome of
particular civil litigation not involving the government. The most recent and certainly
most notorious example is Public Law 109-3 (2005), in which Congress granted federal
jurisdiction over any claims brought by the parents of Terry Schiavo “for the alleged
violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the
United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical
treatment necessary to sustain her life.” Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
This statute was passed after Florida state courts had ruled in favor of Ms. Shiavo’s
husband’s desire to remove all life support including a feeding tube over the objections
of Ms. Schiavo’s parents. Although it seemed clear that the proponents of this statute
hoped to reverse this outcome, the statute explicitly disclaimed making any change in the
substantive law. Rather, the statute purported only to grant jurisdiction to a Florida
federal court, grant standing to Ms. Schiavo’s parents to pursue the claims, establish a de
novo standard for evaluating claims that may have already been considered by Florida
state courts and specify that the federal court should disregard any impediments to
federal jurisdiction based on previous or pending state proceedings. In the short period
between the passage of this statute and Ms. Schiavo’s death, federal courts repeatedly
denied relief, finding insufficient likelihood of success on the merits to grant a temporary
restraining order that would have ordered the reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube
during the pendency of the federal litigation. See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).
(The federal statute apparently did not alter the prerequisites for preliminary relief, which
include a requirement that the party seeking preliminary relief establish a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits.) The courts did not reach the constitutionality of this
statute since they found no basis to grant relief under it. Because this statute and others like
it do not implicate administrative action, it presents issues different from those involved
when statutes attempt to direct the outcome of litigation involving judicial review of
administrative action. Judge Birch, in an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing
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of Transportation to approve a highway design and construction
proposal “[n]othwithstanding any other provision of law.”147 In
response to a challenge to the Secretary’s approval of the highway
project, a federal district court held that the application of the other
statutes to the particular project was foreclosed by the more specific
statute.148 With regard to another highway project, Congress simply
directed the Secretary of Transportation to “approve the construction of
[the highway] notwithstanding section 138 of title 23 and section 303 of
title 49, United States Code”149 and a reviewing court held that this
provision made the statutes under which the plaintiffs had challenged the
highway location inapplicable to the particular highway.150 The court
stated that the new statute provided an exemption from preexisting law
and thus did not impinge on the executive’s prerogative over execution
of the law.151 All of these decisions demonstrate that Congress has a
great deal of power to supervise the executive branch through the
enactment of particularized statutes.152 As long as Congress is careful
not to style its enactments as directing the outcome of particular

en banc in one of the petitions brought by Ms. Schiavo’s parents, argued that the
provisions of the statute that direct the federal courts to hear the case de novo and
disregard potential abstention arguments were unconstitutional because, in dictating the
way in which federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction, “the Act invades the
province of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers principle.” See Schiavo
ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., specially
concurring). The Florida Supreme Court found that a law passed by the Florida
legislature to allow the state governor to stay a court ruling removing Ms. Schiavo’s
feeding tube violated separation of powers because it gave the governor the power to
override a judicial order in a case. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
147. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, §
1212(u), 112 Stat. 107, 198 (1998), as amended, TEA 21 Restoration Act, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 1226(e), 112 Stat. 834, 840 (1998).
148. See Bald Eagle Ridge Prot. Ass’n v. Mallory, 119 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (M.D.
Pa. 2000), aff’d mem., 275 F.3d 33 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here can be no question that the
statutory provisions on which plaintiffs rely have been made inapplicable, regardless of
whether the action of Congress is termed repeal by implication, exemption, suspension,
or any other word or phrase which may be used to characterize this action.”).
149. See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, §
114, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-349 (later reenacted as Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341,
3341-349).
150. Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
151. Id. at 1434.
152. There is also an ongoing debate over whether Congress should have the power
to make constitutional decisions free from Supreme Court interference. While at one
time the debate appeared to be about the principle of judicial review, it often appears
now to involve the pragmatic question of whether particular views are more likely to
prevail in Congress or in the courts. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); Larry D. Kramer, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004).
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litigation, it is free to direct executive discretion even during the
pendency of judicial review litigation.153
Thus, the legislative process, including the budget process, provides
Congress with potent means of supervising the particularities of the
execution of the laws. While the sheer number of administrative actions
and level of technical detail often involved make it impossible for
Congress to monitor the vast majority of administrative actions,
Congress is able, when the right incentives exist, to target favored or
disfavored administrative action for codification or rejection, and it is
free to direct the administrative hand with strong legislative commands.
5. General Statutes and the Administrative Process
In addition to very specific, targeted actions, Congress formally
controls the execution of the laws through more general statutory
provisions. What I have in mind here are procedural and substantive
provisions other than the substantive elements of an agency’s enabling
act that influence agency action. Examples include the APA, the NEPA,
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Government in the
Sunshine Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and other
similar statutes. Included in this category are also numerous reporting
requirements which provide Congress with some of the information it
needs to supervise the execution of the laws both formally and
informally. With these and other statutes, Congress controls agency
decisionmaking through the specification of procedures, standards of
judicial review, substantive limits that agencies may not transgress and
substantive considerations that agencies are required to take into
account.

153. In another case not involving a highway, Congress overrode objections to
decisions by the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow placement of a
telescope in a particular location. Congress had legislatively provided that the University
of Arizona could place a telescope within a designated area and that this placement
would satisfy applicable environmental statutes. After a court held that the approved
placement was not within the area designated by Congress, Congress acted again stating
that placement in the approved location would be deemed to comply with the
environmental statutes. In Robertson terms, the court held that the particular provisions
validly amended otherwise applicable statutes. See Mount Graham Coal. v. Thomas, 89
F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996). The court held that the statute was valid even though a final
judgment had already been entered holding that the placement was not within the area
that Congress had designated because Congress has the power to amend the law
prospectively in a way that would override the prospective effects of an injunction.
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The most important general statute that regulates agency administration
of the law is the APA, which was passed in 1946.154 The APA contains
two sets of provisions, one establishing the procedures that agencies
must follow155 and another establishing a system of judicial review of
agency action.156 After years of political wrangling over the power of
agencies, the APA emerged as a compromise between those who wanted
strict controls on agencies to limit New Deal programs and those who
preferred a weak act that would make it easier for agencies to engage in
aggressive regulation.157
The APA acts as a backup statute when Congress has not addressed an
issue in a statute particular to an agency. Many statutes creating
agencies and prescribing their authority include procedural requirements
and standards of review. The APA includes provisions that fill any gaps
in the agency’s particular statute, including the procedures for rulemaking
and adjudication and the standards of judicial review.158 If an agency
does not follow the procedures Congress specifies, its action is invalid,
unenforceable and subject to being set aside on judicial review.159
McNollgast explains the APA as establishing a set of mechanisms for
Congress to maintain control over agencies.160 According to McNollgast,
the APA is intended to deal with two problems, agency drift and
legislative drift.161 Agency drift is the tendency of agencies to pursue
their own goals, which may be different from the goals Congress
intended.162 Legislative drift is the tendency of a small, influential group
of legislators to use their influence to divert the agency toward their
goals and away from the goals of the legislature as a whole.163 The
relatively loose procedural requirements for all agency activities other
than formal adjudication and the relatively deferential standards of
judicial review mean that the APA may be far from perfect as a tool of

154. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 700-706 (2000).
155. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 551-559.
156. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 700-706.
157. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 182 (1999); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557
(1996).
158. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 553-554, 706.
159. It is important to note both that the agency action is unenforceable and that it is
subject to being set aside on judicial review because even if the time for judicial review
has passed, an agency may find itself unable to enforce an invalid rule. See United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
160. See McNollgast, supra note 157, at 184-85; McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, supra note 18, at 440-42, 472-73.
161. McNollgast, supra note 157, at 184.
162. Id.
163. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107, at 1496 n.177.
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congressional supervision, but imperfection is not inconsistent with the
overall aim.
The subjection of administrative action to judicial review and the
specification of standards of review are mechanisms employed by
Congress to control the execution of the law.164 A desire to conform
agency action to congressional intent may not be the only reason that
Congress subjects agency action to judicial review. Congress may also
be concerned with the protection of individual rights, and may want to
make certain that agencies observe open and democratic decisionmaking
procedures to preserve democratic values. However, Congress is at least
somewhat concerned with ensuring that agencies follow statutory
instructions, hence the APA’s specification that a “reviewing court
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . not
in accordance with law . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority
or limitations, or short of statutory right.”165
Judicial review is an indirect method of supervision of agencies
because it depends on a third party, the judiciary. This raises the
question of whether the federal judiciary is a faithful agent.166 Given the
constitutional protections judges enjoy against overreaching by either of
the other branches of government, one might expect that courts would
feel free to ignore the preferences of the other branches, including
164. Gary Lawson has expressed reservations about the constitutionality of those
provisions of the APA that regulate the standard of review that courts are required to
apply when reviewing agency action. In fact, he thinks that any statute that “regulate[s]
the standard of proof that courts must apply” is unconstitutional on the ground that it
interferes with the judicial function. See Lawson, supra note 50, at 219-26.
165. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A) (2000).
166. Landes and Posner, in an influential article, portrayed judicial review by an
independent judiciary as an ideal enforcement mechanism for the interest group bargains
within the legislature that produce contracts in the form of legislation. See William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). Jonathan Macey questioned this conclusion on
the basis that Landes and Posner did not explain why independent judges have an
incentive to do the legislature’s bidding. See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic
Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 69 (1987). Macey argues that judges
advance the publicly stated public-regarding intentions that legislators attach to legislation
even if the legislators mislead the public and pass the legislation only for self-regarding
reasons, such as to please narrow interest groups that will help them get reelected. In my
view, Macey is correct that courts tend to rely on the publicly stated bases for congressional
action and that these bases are normally public-regarding expressions of legislative intent
and not the interest group oriented reasons that might more accurately explain why the
legislature chose to act. However, the question remains as to why courts rely on
congressional expressions at all, as opposed to some judicially articulated set of norms that
are completely independent of congressional intent.
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Congress. In many situations it appears that federal courts do just that,
pursuing their own preferences and pushing against the language and
congressional understanding behind federal statutes. In the civil rights
area, for example, Congress has repeatedly found it necessary to amend
statutes in reaction to narrow judicial constructions to accomplish goals
that were arguably embodied in the pre-amendment versions of the
statutes.167
Assessing the faithfulness of federal judges as agents of Congress in
the area of judicial review is difficult because in so many cases it is
difficult to discern the intent of Congress. Some technical matters have
been left to agencies with little more than a goal articulated by
Congress—healthy air, clean water, safe and healthy places of
employment. Yet in cases in which the statutes provide guidance, courts
often at least appear to be making significant efforts to keep agencies in
line with congressional intent. Two cases in which agencies were
prevented from taking major policy initiatives provide good examples of
this. In one, the Supreme Court prevented the FCC from exempting all
long distance carriers other than AT&T from the requirement that they
file tariffs with the agency.168 In another, the Supreme Court prevented
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from regulating tobacco as a
drug.169 In both cases, the Court’s analysis centered on discerning
Congress’s intent from the language and structure of the statutes
governing the agencies’ exercise of their authority. In addition to these
substantive examples, the foundation of the Supreme Court’s procedural
jurisprudence regarding agencies, discussed below, is that absent
unconstitutionality, courts may not impose on agencies procedural
requirements different from or in addition to those specified by Congress
in governing statutes, including the APA.170 While one can argue over
whether the Court’s expressions of fidelity to congressional intent are
genuine or whether courts generally are better or worse than agencies at
discerning congressional intent, there is no question that courts,
including the Supreme Court, express themselves in judicial review
cases in terms of congressional intent.171
167. See Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, Fifty
Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981 (2002).
168. MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
169. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
170. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
171. The Court’s recent application of the Chevron doctrine is a good example of
the use of congressional intent to overrule (or in some cases approve) agency action.
When it was decided, it appeared that Chevron would result in greatly increased
deference to agencies. As application of the doctrine developed, however, the Supreme
Court has decided many cases under the prong of Chevron that require agencies (and
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There are several possible explanations for this reality of judicial
behavior. Judges may be following well-developed norms of judicial
conduct either because those norms have been internalized172 or because
judges do not want to suffer the social and professional sanctions that
may be brought down on them if they violate established norms,173 for
example the norm that statutes should not be interpreted in a manner
contrary to the apparent intent of Congress. This is not to say that
judges are perfect agents in administrative law. In fact they are far from
perfect, whether because their independence allows them, at least to
some extent, to pursue their own preferences or because Congress’s
instructions are often not clear enough for even the most faithful agent to
act upon without making errors. The point for present purposes is that it
is rational for Congress to view judicial review of agency action as part
of an effort to control the execution of the law in terms of limiting the
administration’s ability to substitute its preferences for those of
Congress.
In addition to judicial review provisions in the APA and agency-specific
statutes, Congress has employed its legislative power to enact numerous
general statutes that control the substance of agency discretion and the
manner in which the agencies exercise their discretion. These statutes can
be divided into three categories: (1) non-APA procedural requirements;
(2) impact statement requirements; and (3) reporting requirements. The
category of non-APA procedural requirements includes statutes such as
the FOIA,174 the Government in the Sunshine Act,175 the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA),176 the Negotiated Rulemaking Act177 and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Government Act.178 Impact requirement
courts) to follow the clearly expressed intent of Congress, even when, for example,
explaining that clearly expressed intent requires the Court to engage in several pages of
analysis that includes references to the language, structure and history of a statute, and
even application of canons of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
172. Presidents tend to choose judicial nominees who at least appear to have
internalized the norms of judicial conduct, if only because judges perceived to be outside
the “mainstream” are likely to have trouble in the confirmation process.
173. See Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior:
Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 220-23 (1991).
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
175. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000).
176. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
177. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000).
178. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat.
2993 (1998).
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statutes include the NEPA,179 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),180 the
Small Business Act181 and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.182
Reporting requirements include scores of provisions that require agencies
and other executive branch officials to make regular reports to Congress
or congressional committees. Congress has also established a statutory
procedure for congressional review of major rules, the Congressional
Review Act.183 This procedure is sui generis and is discussed above.
The non-APA procedural requirements and the impact statement
requirements have in common that Congress, with some exceptions,
relies on courts to enforce their provisions.184 Statutes such as FOIA and
the Government in the Sunshine Act can have significant effects on
agency action because they open agency records and meetings to greater
public scrutiny than might otherwise exist.185 FOIA opens all agency
records to public inspection and copying except for those records that
fall into a FOIA exception,186 and FOIA is enforceable by an action in
federal court to force an agency to turn over covered records.187 The
Government in the Sunshine Act requires that all meetings of an agency
be open to the public unless the agency invokes a statutory exception,
and even then the agency must follow specified procedures to legally
meet in private.188 If an agency improperly meets in private, any action
taken at the private meeting may be void. FACA similarly requires any
advisory committee with nongovernmental members “established or
utilized” by the President or an agency to conform to open meetings
requirements.189 This statute has been particularly controversial because, on
its face, it means that the President may not meet with a group of private
individuals to ask their advice without giving advance notice of the
meeting, opening the meeting to the public and keeping minutes on what
was discussed at the meeting. This is a significant set of restrictions on

179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (2000).
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
181. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657f (2000).
182. 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715r (2000).
183. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000).
184. Negotiated rulemaking procedures are not subject to judicial review, although
rules produced through a negotiated rulemaking are subject to judicial review if the rule
would have been subject to judicial review had negotiated rulemaking not been used.
See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (2000). The Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides that “agency
action relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating a negotiated rulemaking
committee . . . shall not be subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section shall bar
judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is otherwise provided by law.”
185. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b (2000).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
187. Id.
188. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b)-(c).
189. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
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the President’s ability to confer with nongovernmental constituencies.
Courts have tended to interpret FACA to avoid the serious separation of
powers questions that might arise out of the potential interference with
the operation of the executive branch that a more expansive interpretation
would entail.190 With regard to all of these statutes, the degree to which
they are effective in controlling executive action depends on how
aggressively the courts interpret and enforce them.
In addition to these general procedural requirements, a number of
federal statutes pursue particular substantive goals by requiring agencies
to take account of particular substantive concerns. Statutes like NEPA
and the Regulatory Flexibility Act require agencies to prepare impact
statements describing the effects agency action would have on the
subject of the particular statute such as the environment or small
businesses.191 These statutes are substantive and procedural at the same
time—substantive in that they require agencies to focus on and consider
particular substantive issues but procedural in that they do not require
any particular substantive outcome. For example, NEPA requires that
agencies prepare an environmental impact statement whenever a “major”
federal agency action “significantly” affects the environment.192 NEPA
specifies the contents of the statement and requires that the statement
“accompany” proposed agency action through the approval process, but
NEPA does not require that an agency forego actions that meet some
standard of negative environmental impact.193 Thus, in operation, NEPA
is largely procedural. However, the public process for creating
environmental impact statements, the publicity that environmental impact
statements create concerning the environmental effects of proposed
agency action, and the likelihood that courts will strike down agency
action on judicial review when the statement is inadequate have forced
federal agencies to consider and perhaps reduce the negative
environmental effects of their actions.194
190. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Ass’n of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (2000); 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612
(2000).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
194. See McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation, supra note 22, at 35. The actual
effects of NEPA on the environment are unclear. One study indicates that agencies try
very had to avoid having to produce an environmental impact statement by using
mitigation and other strategies to keep environmental effects below statutory thresholds.
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Another device Congress uses to keep tabs on agency action is the
sunset provision. Under a sunset provision, a statute automatically expires
after a certain period of time. Often, a sunset provision is included for
reasons unrelated to agency action, such as a perception that a problem
is temporary, uncertainty over whether the legislation is necessary or
will work, or simply as a matter of political compromise between those
inclined in favor and those inclined against a proposal. Where
administrative action is relevant, a sunset provision gives an agency a
strong incentive to administer a law in a manner favorable to Congress,
because otherwise Congress will not re-authorize the program after it
expires.
6. Reporting Requirements and Certifications
Reporting requirements are also an effective tool that Congress uses to
exert control over the executive branch. In recent decades, the number
and range of reporting requirements have increased exponentially,
provoking complaints from executive branch officials that the sheer
volume of reporting requirements harms their ability to function
effectively.195 From the other side, there are consistent complaints from
Congress that the executive branch is too reticent about sharing
information with the legislative branch and thus reporting requirements
are justified as a means for Congress to maintain control over the
bureaucracy.196 It is impossible to overstate the volume of reporting
requirements Congress includes in legislation directed at agencies and
the President.197 In part, reporting requirements enable the informal
supervision of agencies that is discussed below. Reporting requirements
are also a constant reminder that Congress is interested in agency
activity and that all such activity takes place under Congress’s watchful
eye. Pervasive scrutiny is designed to keep agencies from straying too
far from congressional intent.

See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
195. See Jonathan G. Pray, Comment, Congressional Reporting Requirements:
Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76 U. COL. L. REV. 297, 298-317 (2005)
(discussing volume and burden of reporting requirements).
196. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004); Raoul
Berger, Executive Privilege: A Presidential Pillar Without Constitutional Support, 26
VILL. L. REV. 405 (1980).
197. A Wall Street Journal report estimated the number of reports required in 1991
at approximately 3000, at an annual cost of $350 million. See Jim Payne, Congress’s
Uncontrollable ‘In’ Basket, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1991, at A14, cited in Pray, supra note
195, at 300 n.10.
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Related to reporting requirements are certification requirements, under
which the President or another official is required to certify to Congress
that a particular state of affairs does or does not exist.198 Certification is
often used in programs involving contingent discretion, that is,
discretion that may be exercised only upon the existence or nonexistence
of the specified state of affairs. Certification, much like a reporting
requirement, allows Congress to keep track of the execution of laws that
involve contingent discretion because the act of certification brings the
matter directly to Congress’s attention. These certifications have legal
consequences, such as making a foreign country eligible for monetary
aid, military assistance, favored trade status and the like. For example,
under one statute, the President may authorize the release of funds for
economic or military assistance to countries that are not in compliance
with certain international nuclear nonproliferation programs, but only
after the President certifies to Congress that the termination of funding
“would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests;
and . . . he has received reliable assurances that the country in question
will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in
doing so.”199 The statute also provides that Congress has the right, by
joint resolution enacted within thirty days of the certification, to reject
the certification, at which point the assistance would cease.200
7. Executive Branch Organization and Agency Structure
Another way in which Congress exercises authority over the execution
of the laws is its power over the organization of the executive branch.
One can imagine a system under which all executive power flowed
directly to the President, who would then manage the execution as he
saw fit, including organizing the executive branch into departments and
agencies. In our system, however, while the President may sometimes
exercise independent organizational power,201 it is largely Congress that
198. See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy
Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217 (1999).
199. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (2000).
200. The statute provides that the assistance terminates “upon the enactment of that
resolution.” § 2799aa(b)(2)(A). Under Chadha, the President would probably have the
power to veto the resolution, and the resolution could not have any legal effect until
either the President signed it or Congress overrode a veto. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).
201. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 77-136
(2003) (discussing agencies created by the executive branch and Congress’s responses).
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decides what departments to create, how to organize those departments
into various authorities and agencies and whether to create agencies
outside of any department.202 If Congress is unhappy with the way an
agency is functioning, it can move it into a different department or even
abolish it. Dissatisfaction with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s performance, for example, led Congress to abolish that agency
and reallocate its functions among agencies within the Department of
Justice, where the INS was located, and the new Department of
Homeland Security. Congress even creates departments over the objection
of the President, as was the case in the recent creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, which President Bush initially opposed.203
Congressional control over the organization of the executive branch can
be a potent tool for supervising the execution of the law.
Often, it seems that the structure of the agency created to administer a
program is as important to Congress as the substance of the regulatory
program. A good example is the struggle between Congress and
President Richard Nixon over the structure of the entities that administer
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.204 The proponents of
federal worker safety legislation pushed for an agency within the
Department of Labor, while the President and business interests favored
an independent agency. The compromise ultimately adopted placed the
standard setting and enforcement agency within the Department of
Labor and created an independent agency to adjudicate violations.205
McCubbins explains that the legislative coalition that passes regulatory
programs structures the implementing mechanism, including setting the
administrative procedures that apply, with the hope that the structure
itself will produce desired outcomes without the necessity of extensive
monitoring or supervision.206 When this does not work, legislators
202. Congress also has granted the President power to reorganize without specific
statutory approval of the new organizational structure. See generally Reorganization Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29, 32 (1977). These reorganizations were subject
to legislative vetoes. See id. § 906. Now that the legislative veto is no longer available,
Congress has provided that no executive reorganization plan can go into effect without
the approval of both Houses of Congress under a special, expedited procedure. See Pub.
L. No. 98-614, § 3(a), 98 Stat. 3192 (1984) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (2000)).
203. Brooke Donald, 2002: The Year in Review: GOP Showed National Gains,
Controlling Congress, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2002, § J, at 2, available at 2002
WLNR 3692699 (“Bush scored a post-election victory with the creationof the Homeland
Security Department, which he initially opposed. Facing criticism from Democrats, he
embraced the concept in June and used it as a political issue in the midterm election
campaign.”).
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-675, 677-678 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3141-1 (2000).
205. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
11-16 (4th ed. 2002).
206. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 18; see also Kathleen
Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative
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monitor and supervise the administration of the program and may make
adjustments to the administrative structure, although this ex post
monitoring may reflect the desires of the supervising legislators rather
than the desires of the original coalition that passed the legislation.207
The power over the organization of the executive branch includes the
controversial power to establish agencies that are independent of direct
presidential control.208 Theoretically, these agencies are supposed to be
insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent
agencies may be insulated from the President, they are often much more
responsive to direct (albeit informal) congressional supervision than
agencies within the executive branch.209 There are several common
features in legislation creating independent agencies. First, Congress
includes in the legislation language indicating that the agency is
independent. Second, Congress specifies that the agency is headed by a
group of commissioners appointed by the President for a fixed term,
often with a requirement of bipartisan membership.210 (The bipartisanship
requirement, and other qualifications that Congress has specified for
various positions in government, can be viewed as additional formal
methods of control. These requirements are constitutionally suspect
because they restrict the President’s authority to appoint Officers of the
United States.211) Third, Congress includes restrictions on the President’s
power to remove commissioners during their terms, usually in the form
of a requirement that they not be removed without good cause.212
Fourth, Congress may include provisions concerning the chairmanship
Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995) (discussing delegation in light of the
possibility of agency drift); Macey, supra note 18 (discussing efforts in Congress to
“hard wire” agencies to produce favored results).
207. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 18.
208. For a general description of the independent agency phenomenon, see FISHER,
supra note 29, at 146-76.
209. Thus, in the usual case, Congress favors an independent agency as a way to
diminish presidential control. In the case of occupational safety discussed above, the
President pushed for an independent agency because the Department of Labor at the time
was viewed as under the influence of organized labor. The President and business
interests must have felt that they might do better in an entity separate from the
Department of Labor even though an independent agency theoretically should be
somewhat less amenable to presidential influence.
210. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2000) (specifying six-year terms for members of
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission).
211. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
212. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (“A member of the [Occupational Safety and
Health Review] Commission may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
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and vice-chairmanship of the agency that greatly restrict the President’s
choices.213 Finally, Congress may include provisions exempting or
restricting the President’s ability to subject the agency’s budget to the
normal review within the White House’s Office of Management and
Budget.214 All of these features are designed to reduce presidential
influence which enables Congress to maintain control over the independent
agencies through informal devices discussed in the next section of this
Article.
8. Advice and Consent on Appointments
Another formal means of supervision that Congress has over the
executive branch, not involving the legislative power, is the Senate’s
power to reject appointments to agencies. Under the Appointments
Clause, appointments of Officers of the United States, which include any
federal official with authority to execute the law, are made by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.215 Advice and
consent is understood as majority approval in the Senate, although under
Senate rules and practices, a committee can prevent a nomination from
coming up for a vote, and less than a majority of the full Senate can
filibuster, which also prevents the full Senate from taking a vote.216
There are two ways in which the advice and consent power becomes a
tool of supervision. The first is the very direct fact that the Senate has a
say in personnel and can refuse to approve appointments if it expects
that the nominee will not execute the law in the manner favored by the

213. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1330(c) (2000) (imposing severe restrictions on
President’s choices of chairman of International Trade Commission).
214. See FISHER, supra note 29, at 162-64.
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
216. “Advice and consent” is understood as a majority vote in the Senate except
when the Constitution specifies otherwise, as in the requirement in Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution that treaties be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the
Senate. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections of
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1272
(1995) (“The Appointments Clause requires Senate majority approval of principal and
inferior officers[.]”). Advice and consent for judicial appointments similarly requires a
majority vote in the Senate. Recently, a controversy has arisen over whether it is
constitutional for the Senators to use procedural devices such as the filibuster, under
which a minority of Senators can vote to continue debate indefinitely, to prevent the full
Senate from voting on a nomination. See Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster
Cause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 803, 822 (tradition is that advice and consent
means majority vote of Senators present and voting; use of filibuster against judicial
nominees is “unprecedented”); Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of
“Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
103, 104-06 (2005) (describing methods of defeating judicial nominees including failure
to hold committee hearings and filibustering).
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Senate.217 This power is often used to “convince” the President to
nominate an individual favored by an influential Senator, providing that
Senator with a loyal friend at an agency who is likely to execute the law
in line with that Senator’s wishes.218 The second, less direct consequence of
the Senate’s power is that approval of appointments can be used as
leverage over related and even completely unrelated areas in which the
Senate has an interest in the execution of the laws.
The choice of which officials to subject to the advice and consent
process is also reflective of Congress’s interest in the execution of the
laws. Congress has been aggressive in legislatively subjecting appointments
to the Senate’s advice and consent power. Congress has insisted that the
appointment of important presidential advisors and other executive
branch officials are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, on
the ground that these officials are Officers of the United States. For
example, in the 1970s, Congress legislatively subjected the appointment
of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget219 and the
United States Trade Representative220 to senatorial advice and consent.
This is also thought to allow the legislature to assert the power to
summon these officials to oversight hearings.221
9. Impeachment and Removal
Another nonlegislative supervisory power vested in Congress is the
power to impeach and remove executive (and judicial) officials. The
Constitution specifies that the House alone has the power to impeach
federal officials and the Senate alone has the power to conduct trials
after the House votes for Articles of Impeachment.222 If the Senate
convicts the official of the violations alleged in the articles of
217. See generally David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology,
20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 438 (2004) (concluding that the Senate’s power over appointments
influences the ideology of nominees chosen by the President). In the next section, I
discuss how informal pressure also influences presidential appointments.
218. Cf. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 278
n.104 (asserting that, while the “Senate has an ameliorating influence on presidential
appointments . . . the exact extent of that influence has been difficult to capture with
certainty . . . .”).
219. See Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, § 207, 88 Stat. 11 (1974)
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 502 (2000)).
220. See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(a), (b)(1)-(2), (c)-(h), 88
Stat. 1999 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (2000)).
221. This point was suggested by John F. Cooney.
222. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 5; art I, § 3, cl. 6.
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impeachment, the official is removed from office.223 This is not
commonly used as a method of day to day supervision of executive
officials, although Justice Scalia noted in his dissent from the Court’s
approval of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act that “the context of this statute is acrid with the smell
of threatened impeachment.”224 Impeachment has most commonly been
used in recent years to remove federal judges who refuse to resign after
they have been convicted of crimes because they have life tenure and
there is thus no other mechanism to remove them.225 It is used much less
often against executive officials because they can usually be removed by
the President or some other supervisory federal official.226 When
impeachment has been used against the President, it has often appeared
to be based more on politics than on serious violations of the law.227
10. Litigation by Congress
Congress has also gotten involved in the quintessential executive
activity of litigating the interests of the United States in court, although
it tends to do so in separation of powers disputes when its own powers
are at stake. 228 Congress has statutorily granted the Senate the right to
intervene in litigation when the “powers and responsibilities of Congress
223. It is not clear that removal is the only punishment that the Senate may inflict.
Joseph Isenbergh’s research on this during the impeachment proceedings against
President Clinton revealed that in the early years under the Constitution, the Senate
imposed lesser punishments such as fines on persons convicted by the Senate. See
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process,
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, Nov. 11, 1998, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/
39.pdf. It has been quite a long time since the Senate has considered a lesser
punishment.
224. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See generally Eleanore Bushnell, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS (1992) (telling the story of the fourteen federal officers
who, at the time of the writing, had been impeached by the House and tried by the
Senate; the majority of those impeached have been federal judges).
226. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORN. L. REV.
215, 219 (2005) (noting that “the President’s most important means of wielding control
arises from his power to appoint and remove executive officials”).
227. Although it is difficult to draw a line between political and nonpolitical uses of
the impeachment power against the President, the impeachments of Presidents Johnson
and Clinton seem to be on the political side of the line while the threatened impeachment
of President Nixon seems to be more directly about criminal conduct.
228. See Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92
YALE L.J. 970, 970 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter Executive Discretion] (detailing cases in
which the predecessor to the Senate Counsel had intervened); Note, By “complicated
and indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and Separation of Powers, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004) [hereinafter Complicated and Indirect] (naming
Chadha, Bowsher, and Buckley as among the cases in which Congress has defended a
challenged statute in court).
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under the Constitution of the United States are placed in issue.”229 The
statute creates the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and the head of that
office is appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate from
candidates recommended by the Senate majority and minority leaders.230
The House employs counsel and participates in litigation on an ad hoc
basis.231 There is disagreement among commentators over whether it is
consistent with separation of powers for the Houses of Congress to
intervene in litigation. The argument in favor of the power is based on
the possibility that without it, the President may exercise an absolute
veto over legislation simply by declining to defend it in court.232 The
response to this is that Congress’s legislative, impeachment and oversight
powers are adequate to ensure that the President defends Congress’s
constitutional powers in litigation.233
It is perfectly understandable that Congress would be skeptical of a
system under which only the executive branch could litigate whether
Congress has encroached too much on the executive power.234 Despite
all of Congress’s formal and informal tools of supervision, the executive
branch is not in a position to argue both sides of the case when its own
powers are at stake. The Supreme Court recognized this in Chadha,
stating, “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend
229. 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2000). For a general discussion of the practice of the
Senate intervening in cases challenging statutes on separation of powers grounds, see
Complicated and Indirect, supra note 228 and Rebecca Mae Salokar, Representing
Congress: Protecting Institutional and Individual Members’ Rights, in COURT IN
CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING RIGHTS 105 (Colton C. Campbell & John A.
Stack, Jr., eds. 2002).
230. 2 U.S.C. § 288(a)(1) (2000).
231. See Executive Discretion, supra note 228, at 971 n.3.
232. Id. at 979-80.
233. See Complicated and Indirect, supra note 228, at 233.
234. On related grounds, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000), which
allows private individuals to assert fraud claims on behalf of the U.S. government, has
been attacked as violating separation of powers by taking away the executive branch’s
control over litigation on behalf of the United States. In light of the long existence of
this type of procedure, the challenges have been unsuccessful. See Riley v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 760-69 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). For the argument that
the False Claims Act violates the Constitution, see id. at 758-69 (Smith, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the False Claims Act is unconstitutional because it takes away executive
branch control over litigation on behalf of the United States, violating the Take Care
Clause and the Appointments Clause). Whether it violates separation of powers or not,
the False Claims Act is an effort by Congress to take away some of the executive
branch’s control over the choice to litigate claims, and thus can be seen as an element of
congressional administration in which the private parties bringing suit are agents of
Congress.
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the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute
is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”235 This is why it is not surprising,
for example, that Congress granted its members standing to litigate the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act236 and also specified that
when and if the Act were challenged, each House of Congress had the
right to intervene in the litigation.237
11. Congressional Excesses and Innovations
Congress is so aggressive in its supervision of the administration of
laws that it has employed methods of supervision that courts have later
found were in excess of Congress’s constitutional powers. The most
prominent example of this is the legislative veto that Congress included
in many statutes granting powers to agencies. Under legislative veto
provisions, agency action was submitted to Congress for review, and
agency action would go into effect unless it was rejected by Congress or,
as was usually provided, by a subset of Congress such as one House or
sometimes even a single committee.238 Supporters of the legislative veto
argued that it was proper because the procedure was contained in bills
that were signed by the President and further, that it was desirable
because it enhanced Congress’s control over the exercise of delegated
legislative power. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Congress
may not take action having legal effect without going through the
procedures specified in the Constitution for legislating, namely that the
identical bill be passed by both Houses of Congress and be presented to
the President for signature or veto.239
235. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).
236. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996)
(formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691).
237. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, § 3(a). The Supreme Court held, in a
challenge to the Act brought by members of Congress who voted against it, that
individual members of Congress lacked constitutional standing because they were not
personally injured by the existence of the Act. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
Ultimately, the Act was struck down because it purported to grant the President the
power to veto items in bills that had already been signed into law. Once a bill has been
signed into law, only Congress, subject to the President’s veto, may change the law. See
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
238. See Phillip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee
Suspension, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1259-60 (1986) (discussing basic nature of the
legislative veto).
239. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957-58. Despite the Supreme Court’s clear rejection
of legal effect for action by a subset of Congress or action by Congress without
presentment to the President, in a recent, and probably unconstitutional statute, Congress
required the approval of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations before any
agency may transfer funds for an E-Government initiative sponsored by the Office of
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A much earlier attempt by Congress to exercise authority over the
execution of the law was the requirement, in various statutes, that the
President seek the advice and consent of the Senate before removing an
Officer of the United States whose appointment had been subjected to
senatorial advice and consent. In 1867, Congress passed a law over
President Andrew Johnson’s veto requiring the advice and consent of the
Senate before the President could remove any official who had originally
been appointed with such advice and consent.240 When President Johnson
refused to comply with this law, he was impeached by the House of
Representatives and avoided removal by one vote in the Senate.241 In
1876, such a provision was included in the law under which a local
postmaster was appointed,242 and when the President removed the
postmaster without consulting the Senate, the postmaster brought suit for
backpay in the Court of Claims.243 The Supreme Court rejected his
claim on the ground that there is no basis in the Constitution for the
Senate to participate in the removal of executive officials.244 Congress
might, through legislation, eliminate an office entirely or prescribe an
expiration date for an appointment, but the Senate has no power on its
own to prevent the removal of an officer within the executive branch.245
Management and Budget. See Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development,
The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act,
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 841, 119 Stat. 2396, 2505 (2005). This is another
“innovative” attempt by Congress to influence the administration of the law.
240. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430.
241. Biography of Andrew Johnson, www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/
aj17.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
242. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, 80.
243. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
244. Id. at 163-64, 176-77. Saikrishna Prakash has recently argued that Congress
does have the power to remove executive branch officials through legislation in four
distinct ways. First, Congress can abolish an office, thereby leaving the incumbent out
of a job. Second, Congress can establish term limits for executive officials, resulting in
eventual removal from office. Third, Congress can mandate removal from office of any
official convicted of a crime. Fourth, and most controversially, Congress can pass what
Prakash calls a simple removal statute, singling out a particular official for removal from
office. See Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889378.
245. In his dissent in Myers, Justice McReynolds relied on the 1820 Tenure of
Office Act as precedent for congressional involvement in removal. See Myers, 272 U.S.
at 186-88 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). The Tenure of Office Act specified a four year
tenure for certain officials, provided that all such officials could be discharged during
their terms at the President’s pleasure and also imposed, one might say retroactively, an
expiration date for the appointments of officials who were already in office at the time
the Act was passed. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582 (1820). What Justice
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Congress is restrained in its efforts to supervise the executive branch
by the elements of separation of powers that regulate who may
participate in the execution of the laws. Only Officers of the United
States may execute the laws, and Congress may not participate in the
appointment of such officers except via the Senate’s power of advice
and consent.246 The Constitution provides that Officers of the United
States are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, except that Congress may legislatively entrust the appointment
of inferior officers to the President alone, department heads and courts of
law.247 The Constitution specifically prohibits members of Congress
from serving as officers of the United States,248 and Congress has not
been able to avoid this prohibition by designating its members as serving
in a capacity other than as members of Congress.249 Officials appointed
or removable in ways inconsistent with status as Officers of the United
States may not execute the laws.250
Congress has run afoul of these appointment and removal requirements
more than once. In the politically sensitive area of the regulation of
federal elections, Congress attempted to keep a hand in the administrative
process by statutorily granting the power to appoint members of the
Federal Election Commission to the Speaker of the House and President
pro tempore of the Senate, and also by subjecting all members of the
Commission to confirmation by both the House and the Senate.251 The
Supreme Court rejected these innovations: the power of appointment is
granted to the President, not members of Congress, and the power of
confirmation is granted to the Senate alone, not both the House and the
Senate.252
McReynolds failed to appreciate is that even if Congress as a whole has the power to
legislatively provide a termination date for an appointment, that does not mean that
Congress may arrogate to itself the power to reject presidential exercises of the power to
remove.
246. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
247. Id.
248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
249. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991). The Court held that members of Congress may not serve on
an authority that reviews the operation of the airports in the Washington, D.C. area. The
Court did not reach the Incompatibility Clause challenge to this arrangement, resting its
decision on more general separation of powers principles. See id. at 277 n.23.
250. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 597 (1994) (arguing that the President must have the
constitutional power to appoint and remove all officers who execute the law).
251. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1975).
252. See id. In a later case, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the presence of
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House as nonvoting ex officio members
of the Federal Election Commission whose voting members were all presidential
appointees. Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir.

116

BEERMANN-FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 43: 61, 2006]

4/20/2006 9:06 AM

Congressional Administration
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In the equally sensitive area of balancing the federal budget, in a 1985
statute, Congress granted the Comptroller General253 the power to
prescribe federal spending limits that under certain circumstances would
become mandatory.254 This provision was held unconstitutional because
the Comptroller General, who is thought of as an officer of Congress in
charge of monitoring the performance of the executive branch,255 is
subject to removal by a joint resolution256 of Congress and is not
removable by the President.257 The Supreme Court held that while
Congress is free to retain power to remove its own officers, it may not
entrust the execution of the law to such officials.258 Thus, while the
Court did not find it unconstitutional for Congress to retain the power to
remove the Comptroller General, it did hold that the Comptroller
General, as an officer of Congress, may not participate in the execution
of the law.259
This is not to say that all apparent structural innovations that Congress
employs to give itself a greater say in the administration of the laws are
likely to be held unconstitutional or that they should be viewed as
unconstitutional. Martin Flaherty finds, in the enormous shift of power
in the direction of the President, good reason to allow devices such as
1993). The court reasoned that although these congressional employees were not voting
members, Congress must have intended them to have influence over the commission,
and any such formal influence by members not appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause violates the Constitution.
253. The Comptroller General is the head of an agency of Congress previously known
as the General Accounting Office (GAO), now known as the Government Accountability
Office. The principal functions of the GAO involve research and reporting on the
administration of the laws.
254. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717-19 (1986).
255. See What is GAO?, http://www.gao.gov/about/what.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2006):
GAO, commonly called the investigative arm of Congress or the congressional
watchdog, is independent and nonpartisan. It studies how the federal
government spends taxpayer dollars. GAO advises Congress and the heads of
executive agencies (such as Environmental Protection Agency, EPA,
Department of Defense, DOD, and Health and Human Services, HHS) about
ways to make government more effective and responsive. GAO evaluates
federal programs, audits federal expenditures, and issues legal opinions. When
GAO reports its findings to Congress, it recommends actions. Its work leads to
laws and acts that improve government operations, and save billions of dollars.
256. A joint resolution is passed by both Houses of Congress and presented to the
President.
257. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714.
258. Id. at 732.
259. Id. at 758-59.
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the legislative veto and congressional involvement in the removal of
executive officials to rebalance the powers of the federal government.260
The Supreme Court itself has approved two of the pillars of the
administrative state, the lenient nondelegation doctrine and Congress’s
power to establish independent agencies and insulate them, at least to an
extent, from presidential control.261 The landmark 1935 decision allowing
Congress to require cause for the President to remove agency officials262
is central to the jurisprudence of the administrative state. The more
recent decisions discussed above concerning the legislative veto, the
structure of the Federal Election Commission and the Comptroller
General’s involvement in the budget process, together with a decision
invalidating the structure of the bankruptcy courts,263 created the
appearance that the Court was likely to strike down all independent
agencies as inconsistent with the separation of powers. This belief was
proven wrong when the Court upheld the independent counsel provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act.264 Another interesting innovation, under
which the Comptroller General was granted the statutory authority to
hear and issue recommendations on bid protests in government contracting,
was upheld by two courts of appeals, largely on the grounds that the
Comptroller’s recommendations were not binding and therefore the
process was not executive but rather facilitated Congress’s investigative
powers.265
260. See Flaherty, supra note 19, at 1828-39.
261. See Abner S. Greene, Discounting Accountability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489,
1501 (observing this development).
262. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
263. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
264. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
265. See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986);
see also Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988). The most
constitutionally difficult part of the scheme was its stay provision. Filing a protest with
the Comptroller automatically stayed the award of the contract. That is not problematic
because the Comptroller does not issue the stay; it is statutorily automatic. Further, the
procuring agency has the power to override the stay. However, the Comptroller, for
good cause, does have the authority to extend the time for making a decision on a
protest, and the extension automatically extends the stay of the award of the contract.
This seems to violate the requirement that only Officers of the United States can take
actions that have legal effects. The Reagan Administration apparently believed that the
stay provision was unconstitutional. President Reagan, when he signed the legislation
involved, stated that he believed the stay provision was unconstitutional, and apparently
his Administration had vowed not to obey it, even if it was upheld by lower federal
courts. Id. at 1105. Nonetheless, both courts of appeals that have considered it have
upheld the statute for similar reasons: the Comptroller’s review is nonbinding and the
power over the length of the stay is not sufficient to convert the Comptroller’s review
into impermissible execution of the laws. See id. at 1110-11; Ameron, 809 F.2d at 995;
City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding a
procedure under which the disposal of surplus government property was, in effect,
subject to disapproval by a congressional committee).
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12. International Trade Oversight
Congress’s involvement in the negotiation of international trade
agreements may involve the most intrusive oversight practice of all.
International trade agreements are negotiated by the United States Trade
Representative, an official in the Executive Office of the President who
is appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate.266 Congress has required, by two statutes, that groups of members
of Congress be designated as accredited members of delegations to trade
meetings and negotiating sessions.267 The first statute, passed in 1975
and amended in 1988, requires the Speaker of the House (upon the
recommendation of the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means) and President pro tempore of the Senate (on the recommendation
of the Chairman of the Committee on Finance) to name five members of
their respective House of Congress to be “designated congressional
advisers on trade policy and negotiations.”268 This statute also requires
the United States Trade Representative to consult “on a continuing
basis” with the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on
Ways and Means.269 The second statute, passed in 2002, creates another
group of members of Congress, the Congressional Oversight Group, and
also designates them as accredited members of trade negotiating
groups.270 Both statutes require that these members of Congress be kept
informed of the activities of the United States Trade Representative, that
they should have access to information concerning ongoing and
proposed trade negotiations and that they should be consulted on trade
policy.271
Another interesting innovation in the trade area that has not been
tested in court involves the role of the House of Representatives in
ratifying international trade agreements. The President negotiates treaties
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, which in the case of

266. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (2000).
267. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2211(a), 3807 (1994).
268. See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 161, 88 Stat. 1982, 2008 and
Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1632, 102 Stat. 1119, 1269 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2211(a) (2001)). The named committee chairmen can also designate additional
members of Congress to be advisers on particular trade agreements.
269. Id.
270. See Act of Aug. 6, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2107, 116 Stat. 993, 1017
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3807 (Supp. II 2004)).
271. 19 U.S.C. § 2211(a); 19 U.S.C. § 3807.
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treaties requires a two-thirds vote.272 Not all international agreements are
treaties, although the line between treaties and nontreaty international
agreements is not very clear or well understood.273 Some agreements,
known as Executive Agreements, are made by the President alone.274
Other agreements, mainly in the trade area, such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are made under legislative authority
granted to the President and are, pursuant to the legislation, presented to
both the House and the Senate for ratification.275
The House’s role in ratifying international trade agreements, such as
NAFTA, is controversial because the Constitution grants only the Senate
the advice and consent power over treaties.276 There is a split among
commentators over whether these arrangements are constitutional.277
There are several possible justifications for allowing the House to
participate in the ratification of trade agreements such as NAFTA. First,
the House shares in the legislative power over tariffs and trade and thus
traditionally participates through legislation in matters such as imposing,
adjusting and removing tariffs.278 Second, the House’s participation is
based on a quid pro quo under which Congress agrees to an up or down
vote on the trade agreement without amendments.279 Finally, assuming
that nontreaty international agreements exist, the line between what may
be done only in treaty form and agreements that may be concluded in
other forms is so uncertain that the government may be free to choose in
any case between the treaty form and some other form, such as an
agreement sent to both Houses under fast track legislation.280 By
272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
273. See generally John C. Yoo, Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (exploring the treaty
versus nontreaty distinction and its constitutional basis).
274. Id. at 765.
275. See id. at 758-59.
276. One court found that the issue of whether NAFTA was a treaty requiring
Senate ratification under the Treaty Clause was a nonjusticiable political question. See
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001); see also
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799,
810-12 (1995). For a discussion of these and other issues concerning international
agreements and U.S. law, see James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through
International Legal Minimalism: A Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade
Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (2004).
277. See Gathii, supra note 276, at 20-22 (citing sources on both sides of
controversy).
278. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
279. This is known as “fast track.”
280. See Gathii, supra note 276, at 20 n.43. The Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law notes that:
[S]ince any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive Agreement
could also be concluded by treaty . . . either method may be used in many
cases. The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive Agreement can
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insisting on participation in the ratification of international trade
agreements, the House maintains some control over the President’s
conduct in the international arena.
In sum, the legislative and other formal powers provide Congress with
potent tools to exert substantial influence over the execution of the laws
and the carrying out of other executive branch activities. Whether
Congress exercises its powers too often, not often enough or instead with
the proper frequency is debatable. From general legislation like the
APA to targeted appropriations riders, Congress has, on numerous
occasions, become involved in the day to day administration of the laws.
The Senate’s power to reject executive appointments is another formal
tool that keeps Congress involved. Undoubtedly then, Congress uses
many formal tools to conduct extensive oversight of the executive
branch.
B. Informal Congressional Involvement in the Execution of the Laws
In addition to the formal methods that Congress employs to supervise
the agencies, Congress, usually acting in smaller groups or even through
individual members of Congress, engages in a great deal of informal
monitoring and supervision of agencies. Informal methods are those
methods that do not require formal action by Congress, that is, no
legislation or impeachment or advice and consent is required because the
method of supervision does not purport to have any legal effect. This
includes informal contact between members of Congress and
administrators, committee hearings, information requests, and other
similar devices. Informal oversight and supervision often take place
with a threat in the background that if an agency does not align its
actions with the desires of legislators, it will find itself subject to
legislation including changes to the substance of its program, changes to
its structure, reductions or reallocations of its budget or targeted
appropriations riders. The informal methods are pervasive and persistent,
and the executive branch knows that almost all of its activities are

be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance. Which
procedure should be used is a political judgment, made in the first instance by
the President, subject to the possibility that the Senate might refuse to consider
a joint resolution of Congress to approve an agreement, insisting that the
President submit the agreement as a treaty.
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. E (1987).
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carried out under the watchful eye of Congress or representatives of
Congress.
To a great extent, the informal methods of supervision are employed
in conjunction with formal methods. For example, Congress has
legislatively required agencies to file periodic reports with Congress.281
These reports are often used as the basis for committee hearings, the
paradigmatic informal method of supervision.282 As we shall see, informal
supervision of agencies is extensive and provides Congress with some
fairly effective supervisory tools to complement its formal powers over
the substance of laws and the procedures and structures of agencies. At
the end of the day, the multifaceted framework of informal contacts,
together with the formal methods discussed above, means that Congress
plays an important superintending role over the execution of the laws it
passes.
1. Oversight
Oversight is the general term applied to a broad range of congressional
monitoring and supervision of administrative agencies, most of which
fall into the category of “informal” supervision. Oversight is the public
face of a vast network of contacts between members of Congress (and
their staffs) and agency officials, including agency heads (and their
staffs). The most common set of oversight activities involves the receipt
of information and the holding of hearings on the activities of agencies.
Although oversight has always been part of the relationship between
Congress and the executive branch, the current structure of oversight
was initiated in 1946 with the passage of the Legislative Reorganization
Act.283 This Act facilitated oversight through two devices, the organization
of the House and the Senate into similar committee structures and the
creation of a professional oversight staff for committees.284 Since then,
oversight has mushroomed, although some may say it has mutated into a
many-headed monster with some agencies scrutinized by dozens of
committees and subcommittees.285 It is apparently very easy for
members of Congress with an interest in a particular agency to assume
281. See Pray, supra note 195.
282. Id. at 301.
283. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at
2 U.S.C. § 31).
284. For a theoretical examination of legislative committee structure, see generally
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
285. For example, a recent editorial in the Boston Globe states that seventy-nine
committees and subcommittees engage in oversight regarding the Department of
Homeland Security. See Editorial, Security at Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2005, at
A18.
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an oversight function within the structure of a committee or
subcommittee. The pervasive nature of oversight and its effect on the
administration of the law has led Steve Calabresi to conclude that “the
congressional committee chairs are in many ways rival executives to the
cabinet secretaries whose departments and personal offices they
oversee.”286
From the perspective of someone concerned that Congress delegates
too much power to the executive branch, informal oversight is an
important ameliorative, picking up some of the slack in legislative
guidance that is lacking in broad delegations.287 Interestingly, over time
there have been widely divergent views on whether oversight is
appropriate and whether Congress engages in too much or too little
oversight. In 1885, Woodrow Wilson complained that Congress wielded
far too much power, was unrestrained and prone to caprice.288 He wrote
that Congress “has entered more and more into the details of the
administration, until it has virtually taken into its own hands all the
substantial powers of government.”289 By 1908, after witnessing a
transformation in the role of the United States in world politics and
strong presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Grover Cleveland, he
wrote that the President is now at the “front of affairs.”290 With the
broad delegations to regulatory agencies that blossomed in the twentieth
century, complaints surfaced again that Congress had abdicated its
lawmaking role, although at the same time there were complaints that
Congress was too aggressive.291 The fact that there are complaints from
286. See Calabresi, supra note 102, at 51. Calabresi spells out three ways in which
congressional committees insinuate themselves into the execution of the law: the
scrutiny of oversight hearings, appropriations riders, and promises extracted by the
relevant Senate committee during the confirmation process. See id. at 50-55. Given that
at least the second and third methods are clearly within Congress’s constitutional
powers, I find it puzzling that an originalist would be so critical of them.
287. For an examination of congressional oversight, see, for example, WHO MAKES
PUBLIC POLICY? THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
(Robert S. Gilmour & Alexis A. Halley eds., 1994).
288. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, 46-49, 315-19 (15th ed. 1913) (1885); Thomas W. Wilson, Cabinet
Government in the United States, 7 INT’L REV. 146, 147-49 (1879).
289. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 288, at 45.
290. Id. at xi-xiii; see also WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 57-60
(1908).
291. Compare Lowi, supra note 21 (arguing that Congress has abdicated its
responsibility to oversee the executive branch) with Calabresi, supra note 102 (arguing
that congressional oversight is too intrusive).
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opposite perspectives indicates that the truth may lie somewhere in the
middle. Perhaps the level of oversight is close to what is appropriate.292
The machinery of congressional oversight is enormous.293 Each House
of Congress has numerous committees and subcommittees, almost all of
which engage in oversight activities.294 The website of the House of
Representatives lists twenty-one House committees and three joint
committees,295 while the Senate’s website lists fifteen Senate committees
and four joint committees.296 The committees in each House are further
divided into several subcommittees.297 At the high end, the Appropriations
Committee in each House has more than a dozen subcommittees.298
More typically, committees such as Agriculture and International Relations
have four to seven subcommittees.299 Each of these committees and
subcommittees has professional staff to perform oversight.
Oversight often involves hearings before a committee or subcommittee at
which agency officials and even department heads are asked to apprise
the committee or subcommittee of agency activities and answer

292. From the perspective of someone who believes in the unitary executive both as
a matter of constitutional design and normative desirability, the oversight process, as
carried out by congressional committees, is a disaster. See Calabresi, supra note 102, at
50-55.
293. The variety of interactions between Congress and agencies is spelled out quite
clearly in RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 68-84 (4th ed. 1987).
294. See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy:
Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101,
103-05 (1997).
295. United States House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/house/
CommitteeWWW.shtml.
296. U.S. Senate: Committees Home, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/committees_home.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2005). The Senate lists a Joint Committee on the Library which the House does not list.
297. See United States House of Representatives, supra note 295 (providing links to
subcommittees); U.S. Senate: Committees Home, supra note 296 (noting presence of
subcommittees).
298. See Committee on Appropriations, http://appropriations.house.gov (last visited
Mar. 15, 2006) (listing 10); U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations,
http://appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees/subcommittees.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2006) (listing 12).
299. See House Committee on Agriculture: Subcommittees, http://agriculture.
house.gov/inside/subcomms.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (House Committee on
Agriculture lists five subcommittees); United States House of Representatives Committee
on International Relations: Subcommittees, http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/
subcommittees.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (House Committee on International
Relations lists seven subcommittees); United States Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee, http://agriculture.senate.gov/sub.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005)
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry lists four subcommittees);
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://foreign.senate.gov/
subcommittee.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
lists seven subcommittees).
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questions concerning the agency’s policies or performance.300 One
might think that the purpose of oversight hearings is to provide an
opportunity for members of Congress to receive information about
agency activities so they can consider whether legislation is desirable.
While this is part of the reason for hearings, more important is the fact
that hearings provide an opportunity for members of Congress to express
their views, often consisting of displeasure with the agency’s performance,
to agency personnel and the voting public. Commonly, hearings involve
long speeches by committee members criticizing agency actions and
demanding change.301 Hearings may include testimony from members
of the public about how agency action has affected them and also from
nongovernmental experts on the consequences of government policy.302
Very often, oversight hearings are carefully choreographed by committee
chairs to help achieve political ends. The sheer volume of hearings
communicates the message that Congress considers itself the boss.
The hearing process also facilitates tacit agreements between
committees and agencies requiring agencies to handle matters in an
agreed-upon way in the future. Committee directives cannot be binding
on agencies after the Chadha decision, which requires bicameralism and
presentment before any action in Congress may create binding law or
have any legal effect.303 However, nothing prevents agencies from
accepting “suggestions” made by committee members at hearings, and
committee members often insist on assurances to that effect in exchange
for foregoing legislative action or further investigation.304 For example,
in the immigration context, the filing of a private bill coupled with a
subcommittee request for a report from the deporting agency results in a
stay of deportation, apparently pursuant to an informal agreement
between Congress and the agency. Given the power of Congress over
agency budgets and substantive law, agencies have a strong incentive to
listen when members of Congress make suggestions at public hearings.
300. See Pray, supra note 195, at 307 (describing usual oversight practices).
301. See, e.g., Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited, 44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 363, 366 n.10 (1995) (observing committee criticism of agency action).
302. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 245, 256-57 (discussing role of public comments before Advisory
Committee).
303. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
304. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Ship, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 780 n.290 (1995) (observing
that “[a]gencies are allowed to defer to other opinions, so long as they make the final
decision” and listing supporting cases).
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Hearings are often part of the many extensive congressional
investigations conducted regarding the conduct of the executive branch.
These investigations and confrontations may be legitimate attempts by
Congress to exercise its legislative power responsibly, but they profoundly
affect the balance of power in the United States government.305 To
support its investigations, Congress has the power to subpoena witnesses
and require them to bring records and other documents.306 These tools
are quite broad,307 and many confrontations between Congress and the
President involve actual or threatened claims of executive privilege
against congressional attempts to procure information from the executive
branch.308 Congressional investigations run the gamut, from looking
into the administration of regulatory programs to investigations of
whether the Department of Justice is acting properly in ongoing criminal
investigations and prosecutions, where disclosure of information can
harm law enforcement and prejudice the rights of subjects.309 Congress

305. See William Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the
President, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 781-84 (2004); Randall K. Miller, Congressional
Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 631, 635-37, 683-87 (1996).
306. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-07 (1975)
(committee subpoena is legitimate part of legislative process and therefore Speech or
Debate Clause protects committee members from civil suit based on alleged
constitutional violations arising out of issuance of subpoena). There has been some
critical commentary regarding Congress’s subpoena power and the related power to
prosecute contempt of Congress. Gary Lawson has recently argued that the Orders,
Resolutions, and Votes Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, requires
that a congressional vote for a subpoena be presented to the President for signing or veto.
See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement
for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1373, 1385 (2005). He bases his conclusion on the analysis of the Orders,
Resolutions, and Votes Clause in Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I,
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided and Why INS
v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005). Additionally, Todd
Peterson concludes that Congress cannot, consistent with separation of powers, compel
the executive branch to prosecute someone for criminal contempt of Congress. Rather,
any prosecution must be subject to normal prosecutorial discretion in the executive
branch. See Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of
Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 612 (1991); see also Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957) (voiding conviction for contempt of Congress for failing to reveal
whether associates were communists because defendant was not given an opportunity by
congressional committee to assert and have evaluated the basis for his refusal to answer).
307. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 453 (1977); Eastland, 421
U.S. at 504-05.
308. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (matter under investigation by
Congress involved alleged false and misleading testimony in a congressional committee
by an executive branch official on the operation of a government program).
309. See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal
Investigations, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373 (2002). Peterson concludes that the
Department of Justice should not be required to provide Congress with information
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frequently seeks to require administration officials to appear for hearings
with documents and other information.310
Public demands by members of Congress for information can place
the President in the uncomfortable position of feeling the need to
maintain secrecy while members of Congress claim that the only reason
for secrecy is to prevent political embarrassment. Committees often
conduct intensive investigations into the conduct of the administration
with an eye toward criminal prosecution and law reform. Executive
branch officials trying to remain loyal to the President often find
themselves under sharp attack from members of Congress seeking
information to use against the President or his policies. For example,
President Clinton’s actions were subjected to intensive scrutiny in large
part by investigations emanating from Congress.311 Investigations can
result in the production of multivolume reports with hundreds and even
thousands of pages.312 Congress’s message to the executive branch is
clear—“we are watching you.”
2. Oversight Institutions
Congress has also established and funded institutions that provide
extensive oversight of the executive branch. In addition to investigations
conducted by Congress itself, the primary entity that conducts
investigations for Congress is the Government Accountability Office
concerning ongoing criminal investigations and that this should be a per se rule without
the necessity of the President asserting executive privilege. Id. at 1378.
310. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Separation of Powers, the Presidency, and the
Environment, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 25, 36-37 (describing congressional
response to protests that the Office of Management and Budget was unduly interfering
with the EPA: “Congress responded by holding numerous oversight hearings at which
administration officials were asked to appear as witnesses to defend their actions.”).
311. Congress’s power to investigate the President is not unlimited. See Marshall,
supra note 305. Marshall explains that Congress has strong political incentives to
investigate the President and little in the way of political disincentives. Id. at 820. He
recommends reforms that would make members of Congress and Congress as a whole
more accountable for investigations of the President as a way of reducing the tendency
toward destructive investigations. Id.
312. For example, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation produced a 2700
page, three volume report on the federal taxation issues related to the Enron scandal. See
Christopher H. Hanna, From Gregory to Enron: The Too Perfect Theory and Tax Law,
24 VA. TAX. REV. 737, 788 n.238 (2005) (discussing Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation,
108th Cong., Report of Investigation of Enron Corp. and Related Entities Regarding
Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (Joint Comm. Print
2003)).
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(GAO) (formerly the General Accounting Office). The GAO, with
approximately 3,300 employees,313 was created by Congress with the
express purpose of engaging in oversight of the executive branch:
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an agency that works for
Congress and the American people. Congress asks GAO to study the programs
and expenditures of the federal government. GAO, commonly called the
investigative arm of Congress or the congressional watchdog, is independent
and nonpartisan. It studies how the federal government spends taxpayer
dollars.314

The research and investigations performed by the GAO, combined with
all of the reporting to Congress that agencies are legally required to do,
enables Congress to keep close tabs on activity within the executive
branch.
The GAO is headed by the Comptroller General, an official appointed
for a fifteen-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, from a list provided by the Speaker of the House and
President pro tempore of the Senate.315 The Comptroller is removable
for cause and inability to perform the duties of the office by a joint
resolution of Congress.316 The length of the Comptroller’s term in office
insulates the Comptroller from presidential influence, and the method of
removal underscores that the Comptroller works for Congress, not the
executive branch.317
The primary focus of the GAO is the performance of the executive
branch, and its reports often focus attention on inadequacies in executive
branch administration.318 The GAO’s nearly 3,300 employees and budget
313. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO: THE HUMAN
CAPITAL STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2004-2006 5, available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d041063.pdf.
314. What is GAO?, supra note 255.
315. 31 U.S.C. § 703 (2000). The requirement that the President appoint someone
from a list provided by the congressional leadership is controversial, but may be
constitutionally allowable in the case of the Comptroller General because he is
considered an officer of Congress and not the executive branch. Whether it would be
allowed in the case of executive branch officials is doubtful. See Hechinger v. Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
316. 31 U.S.C. § 703.
317. This provision also means that the Comptroller may not exercise authority
pursuant to the laws because, as the Supreme Court has held, only Officers of the United
States may exercise such authority and Officers of the United States may not be removed
by Congress, except via impeachment. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
318. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: MORE EFFICIENT USE
OF ACTIVE RFID TAGS COULD POTENTIALLY AVOID MILLIONS IN UNNECESSARY
PURCHASES, GAO-06-366R, (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ docsearch/
abstract.php?rptno=GAO-06-366R (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) (indicating that the
Department of Defense, an executive branch agency, has failed to maintain visibility
over inventory and that “[t]he lack of visibility over inventory and equipment shipments
increases vulnerability to undetected loss or theft and substantially heightens the risk that
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of over $460 million constitute an enormous bureaucracy focused on the
performance of the government.319 The GAO is very active in investigating
waste, fraud and other sorts of abuses by government agencies.320 It has
issued a series of reports under the rubric of its Government Performance
and Accountability series that focuses on the challenges within each
department and non-departmental federal agency.321 The GAO reports
that it has made 2,700 recommendations for governmental reform and that
eighty-three percent of its recommendations have been accepted.322 GAO
reports provide fodder for congressional oversight of federal agencies
and are often used by congressional committees and Congress as a
whole as evidence of problems within the executive branch.
Another entity that provides research for Congress is the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), “a $91,726,000 per year (FY 2004, $101
million proposed for FY 2005) agency staffed by 729 members, [which]
responds to over 800,000 congressional requests each year.”323 The
CRS, an arm of the Library of Congress, produces 1000 reports per year
and updates an additional 4000.324 The subject matter of CRS reports
spans the entire spectrum of federal governmental activity, including
law, social policy, foreign affairs, international trade, national defense,
the administration of justice, retirement, children and families, health
care, and education.325
The CRS is considered an agency of Congress, not the executive
branch. Its director is appointed by the Librarian of Congress, subject to
confirmation by the Joint Committee of the Library, a congressional
millions of dollars will be spent unnecessarily. Additionally, needed supplies may not
reach the warfighter when needed, which may impair readiness”).
319. GAO at a Glance, http://www.gao.gov/about/gglance.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2006) (indicating a staffing level of 3,200 employees and a budget of $463.6
million).
320. See, e.g., Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing
Drug Price Controls?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 678-79 (2001) (discussing GAO
investigation of medical patent fraud).
321. See Key Related GAO Products Issued Since 2003 Performance and
Accountability Series, http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
322. GAO at a Glance, supra note 319.
323. Stephen Young, CRS Reports (July 26, 2004), http://www.llrx.com/
features/crsreports.htm (guide to the Congressional Research Service). CRS’s 2004
annual report states that in fiscal year 2004 it “delivered 889,284 research responses.”
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004, available at
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/CRS04_AnnRpt.pdf.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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committee composed of Senators and Representatives.326 This appointment
process is permissible because the director does not exercise authority
under United States law and thus is not an Officer of the United States
under the test articulated by the Supreme Court.327
3. Informal Contacts
The public face of oversight and hearings exists against the
background of a network of informal, often private contacts through
which members of Congress attempt to influence the execution of the
law by communicating directly with agency personnel. When no
proceedings are pending, members of Congress may communicate freely
with agency personnel and urge the agency to take or forego action.328
Once proceedings begin, the law is less clear. With regard to formal
adjudicatory proceedings, off the record communications are normally
contrary to both the APA and due process.329 In rulemakings, while
there is no question that members of Congress may participate in the
public rulemaking proceedings, the case law is somewhat murky on
whether members of Congress are allowed to communicate outside the
public record with the agency once rulemaking proceedings have
begun.330 The dominant understanding appears to be that in most
rulemaking proceedings, members of Congress may communicate with
agency officials, but the substance of any important communication
must be placed on the public record.331 Further, there is support in the
case law for a rule that members of Congress should keep their
comments to the merits of the issues before the agencies and should not

326. See What is the Congressional Research Service, http://www.loc.gov/
crsinfo/whatscrs.html#about (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). Interestingly, the Librarian
himself is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Librarians tend to serve through multiple presidencies—there have been only thirteen
Librarians of Congress since the founding of the library in 1800. The current Librarian,
James H. Billington, has been serving since 1987.
327. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
328. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7,
12 (2000) (“Congress can and does monitor agencies through . . . informal staff
contacts . . . .”).
329. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(a), (d)(1)(a) (2000):

[W]hen a hearing is required to be conducted in accordance with section

556 of [the APA] . . . no interested person outside the agency shall make or
knowingly cause to be made to any member of the body comprising the
agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably
be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the proceeding, an ex
parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding . . . .
330. Compare Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) with HBO v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
331. See infra text accompanying note 341.
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threaten retaliation if the agency acts contrary to the member’s expressed
preferences.332
There are strong arguments that off the record contacts are legally
allowable in all proceedings other than formal adjudication and formal
rulemaking. The existence of the APA prohibition against ex parte
contacts in formal adjudication and formal rulemaking,333 and the
absence of a similar provision with regard to other proceedings, such as
informal rulemaking, implies that there is no legal bar to nonrecord
contacts except in formal adjudication. This implication may actually be
required by the Vermont Yankee rule that, absent constitutional problems,
courts should not impose procedural requirements in addition to those
specified in the APA and other applicable statutes.334
The Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance on whether ex
parte contacts are allowed in proceedings other than formal adjudication,
and the lower courts have disagreed on the extent to which such contacts
are improper. In the leading cases on ex parte contacts in rulemaking,
two panels of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took different
approaches to the problem.335 The first of the leading cases, the HBO
case, involved a challenge by a public interest participant in a FCC
rulemaking regarding the division of programming between cable and
over-the-air television.336 It was an uncontested fact that many
interested parties communicated off the record with agency members
and staff.337 The D.C. Circuit panel cited pervasive ex parte contacts as
evidence “of undue industry influence over Commission proceedings.”338
The court decried ex parte contacts as constituting a secret record,
raising the possibility that the public record would not reveal the true

332. See D.C. Fed’n Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a
discussion of this and other cases in which members of Congress have exerted political
pressure on agencies, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible
Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 481 (1990).
333. 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(a), (d)(1)(A).
334. For a discussion of the Vermont Yankee rule, see infra notes 428-439 and
accompanying text. In District No. 1, Marine Eng’rs’ Beneficial Ass’n v. Maritime
Admin., 215 F.3d 37, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held that courts lack power to
prohibit ex parte contacts in administrative proceedings when no statute or rule bans
them.
335. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d 298; HBO, 567 F.2d 9.
336. HBO, 567 F.2d at 13.
337. Id. at 51.
338. Id. at 53.
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basis for the agency’s decision.339 The court went on to observe,
however, that “informal contacts between agencies and the public are the
‘bread and butter’ of the process of administration and are completely
appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review.”340 Out of
this muddled analysis, the court constructed two rules. First, once
rulemaking proceedings have begun, agencies should refuse to accept ex
parte communications and second, if ex parte contacts nonetheless
occur, the agency should place them, including summaries of any oral
communications, on the public record.341
The second leading case on ex parte communications, the Sierra Club
case,342 concerned agency contacts initiated by members of Congress,
the President, other executive branch officials and private interests
during the pendency of an EPA rulemaking on pollution standards for
coal fired power plants.343 This case involved allegations of an “‘ex
parte blitz’ by coal industry advocates conducted after the close of the
comment period” and numerous post-comment period meetings with
personnel of other agencies, members of Congress (and their staffs), the
President (and his staff) and representatives of private interests.344 These
meetings included two with Senator Robert Byrd, a powerful Senator
who was very interested in the outcome of the rulemaking because he
represented West Virginia, a state that produces a great deal of relatively
“dirty” coal.345 In this case, a different D.C. Circuit panel began its
analysis by noting that no statute prohibits ex parte communications in
rulemaking proceedings, and then declined to construct a rule barring ex
parte contacts in the absence of a statute forbidding them.346 The court
also observed that the legitimacy of policymaking by administrators
depends on them remaining accessible to members of the public and that
the quality and acceptability of rules may be enhanced by ex parte
communications.347 The court did find some statutory authority to regulate
ex parte contacts in procedural sections of the Clean Air Act that add to
the requirements of the APA.348 In particular, one provision of the Clean
Air Act prohibits the EPA from basing its rule on any material not
placed in the rulemaking docket while another requires that documents
the Administrator of the EPA believes are of central relevance be placed
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
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in the docket as soon as possible.349 From these two provisions, the
court derived a requirement that the agency summarize important oral
comments and place them on the record.350 This court’s decision exhibits
some of the HBO court’s displeasure with ex parte communications
since it expands the domain of the statute from “documents” to oral
communications, but the court’s decision is more lenient than the HBO
court’s admonition that agencies should refuse to accept ex parte
contacts.351 However, the end result is similar in that both courts require
agencies to place documents and summaries of oral ex parte
communications on the public record.
With regard to the meetings with Senator Byrd, the court found it
perfectly fine for the agency to meet with him, as long as the Senator’s
comments focused on the merits of the rule:352
We believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously to
represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agencies
engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so long as individual
Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a whole as expressed in
statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure. Where Congressmen keep
their comments focused on the substance of the proposed rule . . . administrative
agencies are expected to balance Congressional pressure with the pressures
emanating from all other sources. To hold otherwise would deprive the
agencies of legitimate sources of information and call into question the validity
of nearly every controversial rulemaking.353

349. Id. at 402.
350. Id. at 402-03.
351. One aspect of the controversy involves the distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication. The HBO court relied on a prior D.C. Circuit decision that ex parte
contacts are not appropriate in rulemaking proceedings that decide “conflicting private
claims to a valuable privilege” since such proceedings are analogous to adjudication.
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cited in HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Sangamon Valley was a
proceeding to allocate television frequencies among a small number of licensees. 269
F.2d at 223. HBO involved a larger group of broadcast, cable, and subscription
television interests fighting over the right to show various types of programming. 567
F.2d at 19. The Sierra Club court held that the HBO rule does not apply to “informal
rulemaking of the general policymaking sort involved here.” Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at
402.
352. Pressure by a member of Congress was found to be improper when a powerful
member of the House of Representatives threatened to prevent funding of the
Washington, D.C. subway system if the Department of Transportation failed to build a
bridge between the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. and Sprout Run, Virginia. See
D.C. Fed’n Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
353. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 409-10.
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The court’s reasoning recognizes that congressional pressure on agencies
is ubiquitous, but its expectation that agencies will be able to balance
congressional pressure against pressure from other sources may be
somewhat unrealistic. Allowing members of Congress the freedom to
“vigorously” press the interests of their constituents in private meetings
with agency personnel provides those members with a powerful tool for
shaping agency action to their preferences.
The most notorious, relatively recent example of congressional
pressure on an agency on behalf of constituents354 is probably the case of
the Keating Five, in which five Senators repeatedly pressed officials of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, including its Chairman, on behalf
of Charles Keating, not to adopt stricter rules regarding the investments
of savings and loans and then not to apply the new rules to Keating’s
institutions.355 Keating had made substantial campaign contributions to
the group of Senators.356 With regard to a meeting between four of the
Senators and the Board Chairman, at which the Senators were seeking to
end the Board’s investigation of one of Keating’s savings and loans, the
Chairman of the Board reported that because of the Senators’ influence
over legislation, he felt pressure to comply with their wishes.357 Despite
all of the pressure the Senators brought to bear on the agency, and a
pattern in which campaign contributions and pressure on Keating’s
behalf appeared to have been linked, the Senate Select Committee on
Ethics found no violation of law or Senate rule.358
In rulemakings and other legislative-type agency proceedings, off the
record contacts can be supplemented by on the record participation.
Members of Congress can participate in agency processes by offering
comments and analyses of proposed agency action. Their comments are
likely to be influential for all the reasons that agencies fear acting
contrary to the wishes of those in Congress with power over their
budgets and authorizing statutes. Making on the record comments has
the disadvantage of taking a public position that may be contrary to the
views of some constituents, but it also has advantages such as avoiding
the legal uncertainty inherent in off the record contacts. Agencies can
354. “Constituents” should be understood broadly to include anyone whose support
may be important to a member of Congress. For example, Charles Keating’s interests
were advocated by five or six Senators, obviously more than represent the state in which
he lived. For a general discussion of congressional ethics and constituent advocacy,
including the case of the Keating Five, see Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and
Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996).
355. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
70-74 (3d ed. 1998).
356. Id. at 73.
357. Id. at 74.
358. Id.
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base their decisions on the comments in the public record without
worrying about the rules that bar reliance on nonrecord material.
Another advantage of participating in a rulemaking or other proceeding
in a public manner is that when constituents are united in favor of one
position, it allows the member to appear to be fighting for the
constituents. Even in a losing battle, fighting the fight may be politically
advantageous.
4. Legislative History
Congress also influences the execution of the law by producing
legislative history that includes instructions to the executive branch in
addition to those contained in the legislation itself.359 The problem with
legislative history is that it is not voted on by Congress as a whole, and
therefore it does not have the force of law. This is particularly
problematic when the legislative history contradicts or supplements
statutory language. Without getting into the longstanding debate over
whether courts should rely on legislative history in interpreting statutes,
insofar as legislative history does influence the construction of statutes
administered by the President or an agency, legislative history can be a
device of congressional administration.360 Legislative history is used by
committees to illuminate the meaning of statutory language and to
provide other background information on the legislation. What is most
relevant here is that Congress sometimes produces legislative history
containing explicit instructions to the executive branch. Consider the
following excerpt from a conference committee report on an immigration
provision that provides relief from deportation to victims of human
trafficking who can show “extreme hardship involving unusual and
severe harm upon removal”:

359. I have included legislative history in the category of informal congressional
action because when it produces legislative history in the form of committee reports and
the like, Congress has not taken the formal steps necessary to exercise one of its
constitutional powers such as legislation or impeachment. It is somewhat more formal
than many of the informal powers discussed here when it is embodied in reports that
have been adopted by a congressional committee. Nonetheless, in my view it fits better
in the informal category than the formal one.
360. Even within the highly deferential Chevron model, the Supreme Court has
viewed reference to legislative history as a legitimate element of statutory interpretation.
See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 38-40 (1990).
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The conferees expect that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Executive Office for Immigration Review will interpret the “extreme hardship
involving unusual and severe harm” to be a higher standard than just “extreme
hardship.” The standard shall cover those cases where a victim likely would
face genuine and serious hardship if removed from the United States, whether
or not the severe harm is physical harm or on account of having been trafficked.
The extreme hardship shall involve more than the normal economic and social
disruptions involved in deportation.361

Here, in addition to the language contained in the statute itself, the
conference committee has produced a report telling the executive branch
how to interpret statutory provisions that might otherwise leave more
room for executive discretion. The executive branch has the same
incentive to follow the language of legislative history as it does to
comply when members of Congress employ other forms of informal
pressure—the implicit threat of increased oversight, legislative sanctions
and decreased cooperation from Congress in the future.
5. Informal Supervision of the Appointments Process
Another way in which Congress informally influences the execution
of the law is through the appointments process. Although Congress may
play no formal role in the appointment of executive branch officials
other than the Senate’s power of confirmation, members of Congress
have a great deal of influence over who the President chooses for
appointments. The Senate normally recognizes the President’s prerogative
to appoint high level officials such as Cabinet secretaries and confirms
nominations to those positions unless the nomination presents very
serious problems. With regard to less senior positions, however,
powerful members of Congress go so far as to “recommend” particular
persons for positions at the head of or within federal agencies.362 These
recommendations are accompanied by thinly-veiled or implicit threats of
withholding the cooperation that the executive branch needs from
Congress in confirming other choices for this or different appointments,
361. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. REP. NO.
106-939, at 95 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), discussed in Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Human
Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 25 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 451 (2005).
362. This is not a new practice. In Laurin Henry’s book on presidential transitions,
the process for appointment of local postmasters during President Woodrow Wilson’s
term is recounted. The normal practice was to consult with the local member of
Congress. President Wilson balked at appointing unqualified candidates. Ultimately,
Wilson agreed to allow members of Congress to make the choices, subject to the
President’s right to reject a particular candidate and demand that the member of
Congress suggest someone else. LAURIN HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 80-82
(1961).
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in the annual budget process or when substantive legislation is necessary
for the administration to pursue its policies. It is common to see former
legislative aides and other persons loyal to members of Congress in
important agency posts. In bipartisan agencies, when a vacancy belonging
to the party other than the President’s is open, legislative leaders from
the other party have a great deal of influence over who the President
nominates.363 The placement of officers more loyal to members of
Congress than to the President throughout the federal bureaucracy
creates an informal pipeline of congressional influence over the
execution of the law.
6. Informal Supervision and Appropriations
The appropriations process provides another good window for
observing the way that the legislature employs informal tools to supervise
the execution of the laws. Many agencies receive lump-sum appropriations
that contain only general headings but not specific designations for
particular programs.364 Lump-sum appropriations are made in response to
fairly detailed agency budget requests, and the understanding is that an
agency will spend the money in accord with its budget request even
though the particulars of the request are not included in the appropriations
bill365 and even though agency decisions to reallocate funds from a lumpsum appropriation are not subject to judicial review.366 In effect, the
agency’s detailed budget request serves as a promise that it will spend the
money in line with the budget request unless the agency receives
permission to spend the money in a different manner.367 Permission from
363. There is an interesting recent example of disagreement among Democrats over
a Democratic appointment to the National Transportation Safety Board, with Democratic
leaders favoring one candidate with strong political credentials and other Democrats
favoring a different candidate with stronger professional qualifications. See Rich Klein,
NTSB Slot Has Kennedy, Kerry at Odds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2005, at A4. It
apparently goes without saying that Democrats in Congress have the power to make the
choice.
364. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional: Radical
Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
489, 564 (2001).
365. The intended amounts for each program are often included in a committee
report, with the expectation that the agency will treat the committee report as if it were a
statute. See id.
366. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993).
367. See also FISHER, supra note 29, at 100 (explaining how an agreement between
an agency and a congressional committee on the use of appropriated funds replaced the
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Congress to reallocate funds from a lump-sum appropriation does not
come formally via an amendment to the appropriations legislation, but
rather informally via a committee’s explicit or tacit consent.368 Under
longstanding informal arrangements, it is understood that the committee
will be informed of any significant changes to the agency’s spending plans
within the lump-sum appropriation and that if the committee disapproves,
the changes will not be made.369 If the agency violates the terms of the
understanding between it and the committee, it faces statutory restrictions
on the use of its funds in the future.370
There are several reasons why Congress does not include all the
details of the budget in the appropriations bills even though Congress
cares about how agencies spend their funds. First, it is expensive to
specify in writing all of the line items in a spending bill. It would take a
large number of staff hours and mistakes would inevitably be made,
which would require new bills to correct the errors in the original bills.
Second, there would be political costs to including every item in a line in
a bill. Some items would likely be controversial and might provoke
opposition from the public and from within Congress. This would slow
down the appropriations process. While including every item in the
appropriations bill might be a victory for openness in government, it
would come at a great cost to members of Congress who may prefer a
less-open system that works better and gets their favorite programs
funded every year with little or no controversy. Third, both Congress
and agencies may prefer the flexibility to make adjustments as the
material and political realities of the fiscal year reveal themselves. It
would be much more difficult to adapt if each adjustment required
legislation.
7. Casework
Another common method of informal congressional involvement in
the administration of the law is casework. In recent decades, the size of
the staffs of members of Congress has increased substantially, and a
large portion of that increase has been used to provide casework for
constituents. With casework, members of Congress provide an avenue
for relief from problems with the bureaucracy, ranging from simple
replacement of lost benefits checks to help navigating complex
legislative veto after Chadha). See generally MICHAEL W. KIRST, GOVERNMENT
WITHOUT PASSING LAWS: CONGRESS’ NONSTATUTORY TECHNIQUES FOR APPROPRIATIONS
CONTROL (2d ed. Univ. of N.C. Press 1969).
368. See Roberts, supra note 364.
369. See id.
370. See id.
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government approval processes. Casework by congressional offices
runs parallel to the agencies’ own methods for resolving problems.
The distinction between casework and the intervention into agency
proceedings discussed above is that casework is mundane, dealing
mainly with simple bureaucratic errors and procedures. Most of this
activity does not implicate issues of policy, but casework can morph into
pressure on agency policy since it is not always clear whether a
constituent has been the victim of an error or rather a discretionary
denial of a benefit or permit. In any case, the fact is that members of
Congress devote substantial staff resources to helping constituents
ensure that agencies properly administer the law.
The primary function of casework is to win loyal voters, sort of pork
barrel writ small.371 This is one way in which the power of Congress
over federal spending creates a significant advantage for incumbents
seeking reelection. A member of Congress with an effective casework
operation can win thousands of votes from people who have been helped
and from the friends and relatives of those who have been helped.
Agency errors are a good thing for members of Congress because they
provide them with a way to win voter loyalty. Rather than appropriate
sufficient funds for agencies to deal with their own problems or avoid
them in the first place, Congress redirects funding to their own offices
and then helps the squeaky wheel get the grease by acting when a
constituent complains.372 Members of Congress would rather supply the
grease themselves (and take the credit for doing so) than provide
agencies with the resources to do so.
8. The Normative Critique of Oversight
What should we make of congressional oversight? Does oversight
ameliorate the problem of too much delegation to an undemocratic
bureaucracy, or does it upset the separation of powers balance in the
federal government? In my view, congressional involvement in the
371. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989).
372. This is a form of “fire alarm” oversight when members of Congress act on
complaints by constituents rather than “patrolling” the administrative agencies for
problems. In many situations, it makes economic sense for members to wait for
complaints in this fashion, just as fire departments wait at the station for alarms rather
than patrol the streets for fires. The classic article on this is McCubbins & Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked, supra note 22.
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administration of the laws is a healthy counterweight to two somewhat
contradictory problems with the administrative system: the relative
insulation of agencies from democratic control and the increased
presidential supervision of agencies in recent years. The personal power
of the President appears to have increased substantially in recent years as
occupants of the office have gone even further than Ronald Reagan in
their efforts to manage the administration of the law. When viewed in
isolation, it may appear that Congress’s involvement is excessive.
However, when viewed in light of the increases in presidential
supervision over the last twenty-five years, it is difficult to say whether
Congress’s influence has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same.
Congressional administration may be important to maintaining any hope
for balance.
This may be heresy to those who read the Constitution as placing all
power over the execution of the laws in the hands of the President.
However, as long as Congress does not purport to act with legal effect
without properly exercising its legislative powers, there is no separation
of powers problem and the overall effects are probably positive.
Presidential involvement is more likely to move agency decisions away
from the preferences of the political community than congressional
involvement because it is very difficult to know whether the President’s
views on any single issue are shared by the electorate. By contrast, the
535 members of Congress are more likely to represent the spectrum of
views across the community. On this understanding, oversight increases
the transparency and accountability of administrative law.
There are those who disagree with this assessment, largely on the
ground that oversight is not a particularly democratic process and may
skew the outcomes of the administrative process in the direction of
powerful legislators in leadership positions or on key committees.373
Oversight occurs largely through the actions of committees, subcommittees
and individual members of Congress, and there is reason to fear that
these subgroups do not represent the views of Congress as a whole.374
373. See Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18.
374. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 18, at 1525.
Seidenfeld notes two related problems, first that oversight may not represent the views of
Congress as a whole and second that oversight represents current views and not the views
of the original coalition that passed the legislation involved. In my view, the first problem
is more serious because it entails a charge that oversight is undemocratic. On the second
issue, in my view there is nothing theoretically wrong with current views influencing the
execution of the law. In fact, we expect that when a new President is elected, the execution
of the law will be in line with the new President’s policies. The first problem is explored in
greater detail, and characterized as one of agency cost between Congress as principal and
committee as agent in DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107. See also Lupia & McCubbins,
supra note 18; McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 18.
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Committee chairs in particular have a great deal of power and can use
that power to push agencies around without much of an indication that a
majority in Congress would endorse the particular manifestation of
legislative oversight.375 For example, if an agency acts in response to a
threat by a single subcommittee chair, the agency’s action may not
reflect the overall will of Congress or even the committee or subcommittee
as a whole. This problem has been described as an example of principalagent slack between the majority in Congress (or the legislative coalition
that passed the legislation being administered) as principal, and the
committee, subcommittee or individual members of Congress, as
agents.376 Slack exists in a principal-agent relationship when the agent
(in our example, the subcommittee chair) fails to carry out the will of the
principal (in our example, Congress or the enacting coalition).
A partial answer to this challenge to oversight is that it all takes place
within a structure created by Congress and that Congress as a whole has,
in effect, delegated oversight powers to the individuals and groups that
exercise them, with tacit agreements that make individual members and
committees free to act without interference from others as long as they
do not stray too far from overall congressional preferences. This occurs
even in the formal legislative process itself, in which committee chairs
can prevent legislation favored by a majority from reaching the floor and
in which a few influential legislators can insert language into bills that
others will vote for out of party discipline or as part of a trade-off for
their own favored legislation. Even though power is not distributed
evenly throughout Congress and members with leadership positions will
have much more power than others to push agencies toward their

375. There is some evidence that campaign contributions may have their greatest
effect in matters of low visibility before committees. See Jean R. Schroedel, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Outcomes, 39 W. POL. Q. 371 (1986). Further, lobbying
groups may allocate contributions, and other means of procuring support, between
legislators and administrators depending on which entity has the authority to make
pivotal decisions. See Guy L. F. Holburn & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, Influencing
Agencies through Pivotal Political Institutions, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 458 (2004). The
authors note that sometimes the pivotal decisionmaker will be on the extreme end of the
spectrum of views on the relevant subject. Id. at 461.
376. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107; see also Jonathan Bender & Terry
M. Moe, Agenda Control, Committee Capture and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics,
80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1187 (1986); Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and
Bureaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536 (2002) (discussing incentives for
individual legislators to subvert overall legislative intent).
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preferences, Congress as a whole is responsible for the structure of
oversight and its substantive outcomes.
Another positive element of oversight is that it may make an entrenched
bureaucracy more responsive to the popular will when even the President
cannot secure control over agency policy. Oversight can be viewed as a way
to combat the general insulation of agencies from political accountability.
Under some circumstances, the views of members of Congress engaged in
oversight may be closer to those of the President than the views of agency
officials whose service began before the most recent presidential election.
For example, after eight years of the Clinton Administration, oversight by
members of the Republican-dominated Congress might have helped bring
agency action taken by career officials who were hired or served during
the Clinton Administration closer to the views of Republican President
George W. Bush. While the President’s primary instruments of control
include the ability to appoint and remove agency heads and other important
personnel, oversight by powerful members of Congress under these
circumstances could result in agency policies that are closer to the
President’s preferences than he might otherwise be able to achieve.377
These are not complete answers to the critique of oversight because
they may allow for too much deviation from the terms of the legislative
program and from the preferences of Congress as a whole given that
oversight does not include the discipline of public majority votes in
Congress.378 Further, ignoring the principal-agent slack between Congress
as a whole and those conducting oversight is a bit like saying that,
because employers do not find it worthwhile to engage in enough
monitoring to catch every act of stealing by employees, the employees
have been given permission to steal. More to the point, although we
understand that all actors within the administrative process, including the
President, agency officials, judges conducting judicial review and
members of Congress, pursue their own aims within the process, this
does not disable us from criticizing their actions for straying too far from
congressional intent as embodied in legislation. There are reasons to be
wary of a system of oversight that allows individual members of
Congress, or small groups within Congress, to shape administrative

377. Thanks to Michael Harper for suggesting this point.
378. As noted, because I find oversight that reflects the views of the current Congress
perfectly acceptable, I find the second problem more serious than the first. See
Seindenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 18, at 1525, and text accompanying
note 374. Mark Seidenfeld’s criticism of oversight rests on the view that agencies, because
of their expertise and relative isolation from the political process, are more deliberative than
congressional committees and thus more likely to pursue the public interest as understood
from the “civic republicanism” perspective. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification,
supra note 18, at 1515.
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action. The mechanisms within Congress for disciplining members for
abusing their authority by thwarting the will of Congress may not be
strong enough to ensure that oversight reflects the priorities of Congress
as a whole. Action taken in response to oversight by a congressional
committee may be less problematic than action in response to pressure
from a single member, because the hearings are public and the
membership of the committee is somewhat reflective of the membership
of Congress as a whole, but this is far from perfect. Even a relatively
large and bipartisan committee membership may reflect a special interest
in an issue from a perspective not shared throughout Congress under
conditions in which no one has sufficient incentive to challenge the
committee’s actions.379
Does this mean that we should take steps to limit oversight? In my
view, the question here becomes a matter of the second best. If
oversight activities were reduced or reshaped so as to avoid the
principal-agent problem, the system would probably worsen because
agencies would then be freer to act in line with their own preferences
with much less regard for congressional intent. At present, agencies act
within the universe of the preferences of the President, the federal
courts, Congress as a whole and those conducting oversight, whose
views may or may not reflect the preferences of Congress as a whole.
Judicial review and presidential supervision are, in my view, inferior
methods of ensuring that agencies are responsive to the will of their
ultimate principals. Presidential supervision without effective congressional
oversight is more of a threat to democratic values than congressional
oversight because it can occur privately, and the President may have
been elected for reasons completely unrelated to the particular regulatory
issues involved. Judicial review is episodic, limited to those controversies
that present justiciable cases, and is subject to the will of judges who are
even less connected to the popular will than members of Congress.380
379. Because most oversight is informal, that is, no subgroup in Congress takes
action that purports to have legal effect, oversight does not violate the rule against
legislative vetoes. Arguably, however, oversight by narrow groups within Congress is in
tension with the values underlying the bicameralism and presentment requirements
which counsel against allowing a subgroup within Congress to affect legal rights and
duties.
380. See Beermann, supra note 173; Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-86 (1991). For a more
optimistic view on the possibility of judicial action to advance the public interest see
Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
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Unless someone provides a convincing argument that judges pursue the
public good, as embodied in congressional legislation, as opposed to
their own private interests, including seeing their own political ideals
enacted into law, there is good reason to doubt that judicial review
presents the greatest promise for enforcing and enacting Congress’s
will.381 Perhaps reforms to oversight would be desirable, but it appears
that this is a case in which care must be exercised to avoid creating a
cure that is worse than the disease.
In summary, Congress has many methods, both formal and informal,
to supervise the day to day execution of the laws. Formally, Congress’s
legislative power and the Senate’s power of advice and consent over
presidential appointments are potent tools for influencing the administration’s
execution of the laws. Congress’s power over the budget, and its power
to prescribe the substance and procedures governing the execution of the
laws, force the executive branch to remain attentive to Congress’s
wishes as it executes the laws passed by Congress. Congress also
engages in constant informal monitoring of, and input into, the execution
of the laws. Hearings, investigations, ex parte contacts, tacit agreements
and “recommendations” for appointments provide Congress with the
ability to, if not control, at least strongly influence the execution of the
law. From Congress’s perspective, the executive branch is its agent, and
Congress does whatever it can within, and sometimes without, the
Constitution to make it so.
II. CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In this section, I look at what I consider the “big three” of administrative
law doctrines—the nondelegation doctrine, which regulates the degree
of discretion Congress may delegate to agencies, the Chevron doctrine,
which specifies the standard of review of agency decisions of statutory
construction,382 and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, which holds that
courts may not impose on agencies procedural requirements beyond
those required by the Constitution and applicable statues and rules.383
The goal of this section is to examine whether our understanding of
these doctrines should be altered based on a better understanding of
congressional administration.
381. But see Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18, at 1095
(concluding that judicial review is superior to political review for ensuring the “legality
and wisdom of agency decisions”).
382. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
383. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
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A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine is a black letter rule that prohibits
Congress from delegating its legislative power.384 This rule is rarely
applied, and the term “nondelegation doctrine” as used in most
circumstances is really a misnomer for a doctrine that allows Congress
to delegate a great deal of discretionary authority to the executive
branch.385 As Tom Merrill recently put it, our understanding of delegation
comprises two competing postulates: “The first says only Congress may
exercise legislative power. The second says only Congress may delegate
legislative power.”386 So understood, the nondelegation doctrine, which
allows Congress to delegate to administrative agencies the power to
make legislative rules, is one of the pillars of the administrative state.
Without the authority to delegate, the administrative state would only
slightly resemble the current governmental structure. In matters involving
only the execution of the laws,387 while there is always some discretion
inherent in enforcing the law, the President would be more of a
ministerial employee of Congress, and Congress would be required to
write statutes containing nearly all of the details that are now included in
administrative rules.388 This means that in those areas in which the
President depends on Congress for discretionary authority, the powers of
the two branches are symbiotic rather than competitive. In other words,

384. See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935).
385. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004). I do not mean to take sides in
the debate over whether there is or should be a nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution.
Compare Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) (arguing that limits on
delegation of discretion to the executive branch are required by the word “proper” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause) with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (arguing that there should be no
nondelegation doctrine beyond the bare prohibition on the delegation of power to make
actual laws). As a positive matter, I do not think it is controversial that the conventional
nondelegation doctrine does not significantly rein in Congress’s proclivity to delegate
discretion.
386. See Merrill, supra note 385, at 2099.
387. In areas in which the President’s authority does not depend on delegations
from Congress, the President would retain discretion even in the absence of the current
permissive nondelegation doctrine.
388. Adjudicatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and National
Labor Relations Board might survive a more restrictive nondelegation doctrine although
they would not be able to make legislative rules to supplement or supplant the case by
case adjudicatory decisionmaking process.
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reducing Congress’s power to delegate would not increase the executive
branch’s power. Instead, it would decrease it since the President and the
agencies would no longer be able to receive delegated discretionary
authority.
The conventional nondelegation doctrine is not confined to a
prohibition of Congress granting to someone else the actual legal power
to make public or private laws. Rather, the doctrine also limits
Congress’s power to delegate discretionary authority to make rules or
other pronouncements with the force of law. This limit is expressed by
the Supreme Court as the “intelligible principle” doctrine, which allows
Congress to delegate as long as it legislates an intelligible principle
under which the agency must act.389 The intelligible principle doctrine is
very lenient, requiring only that Congress identify an agency’s jurisdiction
and point it in the desired direction.390 The best examples of the breadth
of allowable agency discretion are goals-type statutes, such as the Clean
Air Act, under which Congress legislated the goal of clean air and
allowed the EPA to fill in details such as the definition of clean air and
what specific limits should be placed on sources of pollution.391
Should the fact of congressional administration alter our understanding of
the nondelegation doctrine? In my view, it should. Because Congress
exercises a great deal of control over the discretionary activity of the
executive branch, then insofar as the basis for the nondelegation doctrine
is to ensure that Congress maintains control over important government
decisions,392 we should embrace the lenient nondelegation doctrine
because Congress is able to keep tabs on the exercise of the delegated
discretion. This approach to nondelegation is not new. It was advocated
as long ago as 1969 by Kenneth Culp Davis393 and may help explain at
least one lower court decision that in 1971 upheld the delegation to the
President to take action to stabilize wages and prices.394
Further, informing the lenient nondelegation doctrine with the realities
of congressional administration is consistent with longstanding separation
of powers principles. Because nondelegation challenges cannot be
decided with resort to a simple procedural provision of the Constitution
(unless Congress delegates the actual legal authority to legislate, which
389. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928);
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
390. See Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
391. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 462, 471.
392. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
393. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
715 (1969). Davis advocated looking at all the safeguards that prevent agencies from
exercising uncontrolled power.
394. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
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would violate the procedures in the Constitution for passing bills), a
standard for nondelegation challenges must be constructed in light of
general separation of powers concerns. General separation of powers
standards are concerned with whether Congress is engaged in selfaggrandizement or whether another branch has been unduly restricted in
its ability to function.395 These are institutional realities rather than
legalistic considerations. For example, when the Supreme Court upheld
the provision for independent prosecutors in the Ethics in Government
Act, Justice Scalia’s strongest argument in dissent was that the majority
did not appreciate just how difficult the law made it for the President to
exercise his power to execute the law.396 Another good example of this
style of separation of powers reasoning is the Court’s opinion upholding
legislation that allowed the government to take control of President
Richard Nixon’s papers.397 The Supreme Court, in its opinion rejecting
Nixon’s challenge to the law requiring him to turn his papers over to the
government, seemed much more concerned with institutional realities,
such as the fact that the papers would remain in the custody of executive
branch officials and that President Ford signed the legislation, than with
doctrinal niceties.398 In delegating, Congress is not hindering any other
branch from performing its constitutional functions and there is no
danger that Congress’s own power will be overly limited, since
Congress can always repeal or narrow the delegation. Thus, taking
into account the realities of congressional administration, the
nondelegation doctrine should remain lenient and delegation should not
be feared by those concerned with separation of powers.
Although the current intelligible principle doctrine for determining
whether Congress has delegated too much discretion may set a proper,
lenient level of nondelegation scrutiny, it does not explicitly take
account of congressional involvement and thus is not subject to
adjustment in cases in which such involvement is absent. However, the
nondelegation doctrine could be made explicitly sensitive to the reality
of congressional supervision of the administration of the laws. For
example, the nondelegation doctrine might be more lenient with regard
395. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-96 (1988); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it
prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.”).
396. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
397. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425.
398. Id.
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to agencies required to make their rules pursuant to public rulemaking
procedures because these, and the requirements of the Congressional
Review Act,399 facilitate congressional involvement in the rulemaking
process. A court might require a somewhat more detailed intelligible
principle in a statute that delegates rulemaking power that is not subject
to the APA’s rulemaking procedures or the requirements of the
Congressional Review Act, although even then, ex post oversight might
be enough to justify lenient nondelegation norms.400 In sum, the fact of
congressional administration supports the leniency of the nondelegation
doctrine, at least in those situations in which the agency action is public
enough to provide an adequate opportunity for oversight.
B. The Chevron Doctrine
The second pillar of contemporary administrative law examined here
is the Chevron doctrine.401 The Chevron doctrine comprises a set of
rules governing the degree to which courts should defer to agency
statutory interpretation,402 but it has achieved iconic status, perhaps
because of what it has to say about the relationship among the three
branches of the federal government in the administrative state. The
problem with analyzing Chevron in light of congressional administration
is that the doctrine is somewhat difficult to describe accurately because
the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are not consistent about it.
The Chevron decision, itself, signaled that significantly greater
deference would be given to agency interpretations of the statute that the
agency administers.403 That is certainly how lower courts and commentators

399. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
400. This analysis assumes that congressional administration restrains executive
discretion in a positive way by making the executive more responsive to the will of
Congress. As discussed above, the unrepresentative nature of a great deal of oversight
may mean that the administration becomes particularly responsive to a few powerful
members of Congress but not to the preferences of Congress as a whole. If this critique
is accurate, then congressional administration becomes at worst neutral on the
nondelegation issue. That is, congressional administration would not detract from the
reasoning that has led to a lenient nondelegation doctrine, but it would not add to it
either.
401. Named for Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
402. Id. at 842-43.
403. One recent study concludes that after Chevron, the level of deference the
Supreme Court shows toward agencies has increased with regard to both formal and
informal agency action. See RUTH ANN WATRY, ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE AFTERMATH OF CHEVRON V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
(2002).
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understood it at the time.404 The Chevron Court outlined a two step
process for judicial review of agency interpretations.405 In step one, the
Court stated that agencies and courts are bound to follow Congress’s
clearly expressed intent.406 The Court indicated that Congress’s intent
would be viewed as clear only when “Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.”407 The phrases “directly spoken” and
“precise question” point toward a narrow scope for step one. However,
in later cases, the Court has broadened the reach of step one by relying
on “traditional tools of statutory construction” and other factors to
discern clear congressional intent. Post-Chevron cases have employed,
among other tools, the plain meaning rule,408 canons of statutory
construction,409 the structure and history of regulation in an area,410 and
the relationship between the provision under construction and other
provisions411 to discern and apply Chevron step one and reject agency
interpretations.412 At the Supreme Court, Chevron is invoked both
against and in favor of deference to agency statutory interpretation.
Deciding whether a case should be resolved under Chevron step one is
another way of deciding whether the agency decision under review
should receive any deference at all. If a case is resolved under step one,
this means that the reviewing court finds that the statute is clear, and the
court then measures the agency action against that clear meaning. No
deference is shown to agency interpretations in cases resolved under
Chevron step one. It is the steady expansion of the universe of cases that
is resolved at step one that has transformed the Chevron doctrine, at least
at the Supreme Court level, from a doctrine of deference to a doctrine of
de novo review of agency statutory interpretation. The devices courts
have used in step one cases, including the plain meaning rule, the other
404. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; Richard Pierce, Jr.,
Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1122-27
(1995).
405. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
409. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
410. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
411. Id.
412. See Board of County Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“Applying Chevron’s two-step test, we first conduct a de novo review to determine
whether the plain language of the applicable statutory provisions clearly demonstrates
congressional intent.”).
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canons of statutory interpretation, and relating the issue under review to
other statutes to determine which statutory meaning would best comport
with the structure and history of regulation, are all helpful devices that
courts can use to discern statutory meaning. However, in most cases
they help fill gaps in the specific coverage of the statute rather than
reveal an actual intent on the part of members of Congress regarding the
particular question.413 For example, although the Court resolved the Brown
& Williamson case under Chevron step one,414 no one really knows
whether Congress intended for the FDA to be able to regulate tobacco
products. The Court’s reasoning against agency power may be persuasive,
but the expertise and political accountability of the head of the FDA may
have made him a more reliable decisionmaker on that matter.
In cases in which Chevron applies but cannot be resolved under step
one, review becomes very deferential.415 The Court specified in step two
of Chevron that when Congress leaves a gap in a statute or when a
statute is unclear, courts should defer to permissible (in the case of gaps)
or reasonable (in the case of lack of clarity) agency interpretations.416 The
theory justifying deference in these cases is that Congress intends,
explicitly when it leaves a gap and implicitly when it is unclear, for the
agency to be the primary interpretive body. Although the Court has not
had much to say on the matter, it appears that step two simply asks
whether an agency’s interpretation is reasonable or permissible.417
Understanding how congressional administration should affect Chevron
requires some consideration of the basis or bases of the Chevron
doctrine. This inquiry is complicated by the two-faced nature of Chevron.
A doctrine of antideference will have a much different normative basis
than a doctrine of deference. There are at least three bases that have
been relied upon by the authors and supporters of the original,
deferential, version of Chevron. First, Congress intends for agencies to
be the primary interpreters of statutes they administer. Second, agencies
may be better than courts at discerning and applying congressional
intent. The agencies are closer to the political process that created the
statutes they administer, and their expertise makes them better able to
sensibly apply those statutes to new, and perhaps unforeseen,
circumstances. Third, agencies are politically accountable through the
President. While this accountability may be attenuated, it is superior to
413. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
414. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120.
415. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1997).
416. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
417. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 534-35 (2002); Levin,
supra note 415, at 1260-62.
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the virtual insulation of federal judges from politics. If agencies are
relatively better at statutory interpretation than courts and are more
politically accountable, then a deferential Chevron doctrine is preferable
to a nondeferential attitude toward agency interpretations.
What are the bases for a nondeferential version of Chevron, in which
agency statutory interpretation decisions are essentially reviewed de
novo using traditional tools of statutory interpretation? Fundamentally,
a combination of factors explains why the Court has turned away from
the deferential version of Chevron. First, the Court is an activist
institution with final say, and it appears that the Court finds it difficult to
step aside and allow an agency to interpret a statute contrary to what the
Court believes is the most accurate (in terms of legislative intent) or best
(in terms of policy) meaning of the statute. This tendency is supported
by the traditional norm that questions of law are for the courts and also
by the separation of powers doubts that were raised about Chevron.418 It
should thus not be surprising that a doctrine of extreme deference to
agency statutory interpretations would not survive for long. Further,
Chevron seemed inconsistent with the notion that the relative insulation
of the courts from politics and federal judges’ superior legal skills make
them better at statutory interpretation than agencies.
How congressional administration should affect Chevron depends on
which Chevron is being analyzed. Sustained congressional involvement
in the administration of the law bolsters the bases for original, very
deferential, Chevron.419 Congressional administration reinforces the notion
that agencies have more information about the political process from
which the interpreted statute emerged and should thus be in a better
position than the courts to discern the meaning of the statute. Further,
418. See Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes:
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
419. The analysis is quite different if one takes a negative view of congressional
administration. On the negative view of congressional administration, a few members of
Congress are able to advance their views without regard to whether they reflect the will
of the majority in Congress. There would be no reason for confidence that agencies are
doing a better job of interpreting congressional intent than courts. Under prevailing
norms, the federal courts are supposed to be searching for the meaning of statutes, and
they are less likely to be influenced by the politics of the moment than agency officials
under intense pressure from powerful members of Congress. A deferential version of
Chevron increases the likelihood that agencies will be able to stray from the original
meaning of statutes.
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agencies are even more politically accountable than originally understood
because they answer to the President and to Congress as well as to the
courts on judicial review.420 On this view, the movement away from a
deferential Chevron to an enlarged, nondeferential step one, has been
misguided because it is insensitive to the superior position occupied by
agencies vis-à-vis discerning and applying Congress’s intent. The more
that Congress is involved in the administration of the law, the larger the
relative advantage enjoyed by agencies over courts in interpreting
statutes administered by agencies. In general, congressional administration
counsels against an expansive view of what materials are relevant to the
step one inquiry, because agencies are in a better position than courts to
discern clear congressional intent.
The Chevron decision has spawned an enormous body of case law and
academic commentary on a wide spectrum of issues, including whether
the doctrine itself is consistent with separation of powers, the effect of
the Chevron doctrine on affirmance rates,421 when the doctrine should
apply,422 and what sort of analysis courts should use to determine
whether Congress’s intent is sufficiently clear to allow the case to be
resolved under step one. These last two issues have become very important
to determining the degree of deference courts will show to the agency’s
decision.
In terms of when Chevron should apply, on the one hand,
congressional administration counsels in favor of applying Chevron
when there are likely to be good channels of communication between
Congress and the agency and, on the other hand, against applying
Chevron when there are not. This understanding may actually be
somewhat consistent with the Supreme Court’s current doctrine. In
recent cases, the Court appears to have settled on a domain for Chevron
that takes into account the formality of the procedures Congress
empowers the agency to use.423 For example, in United States v.
420. Here, I find myself in disagreement with Dean Kagan’s apparent suggestion
that Chevron deference be accorded to interpretations by executive branch agencies but
not to those of independent agencies because independent agencies are not accountable
to the President. Independent agencies are politically accountable to Congress, and
being that it is Congress’s intent that is involved in statutory interpretation cases, that
accountability may be superior for Chevron purposes to accountability through the
President. See Kagan, supra note 19, at 2376-77; see also Morrison, supra note 20, at
1701.
421. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
422. On the application of Chevron in customs decisions, see Michael Cornell
Dypski, Standard of Judicial Review for Administrative Decisions of the United States
Customs Service: Past, Present, and Future, 28 N.C. J. INTL. L. & COM. REG. 103 (2002).
423. The Court has held that only agency decisions with the “force of law” are
entitled to Chevron deference, and that whether an agency decision has the force of law
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Mead,424 the Court held that an agency statutory interpretation that
formed the basis of a “ruling letter” that was issued without notice and
comment, but rather as part of an internal enforcement process, was not
entitled to Chevron deference.425 Rather, less formal decisions such as
this one are entitled to what is known as Skidmore deference, after
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.:426
“[T]he well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance,’” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S., at 139-140), and “[w]e have long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .” Chevron,
supra, at 844, (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
450 (1978). The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own
statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked
to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position, see Skidmore,
supra, at 139-140.427

There are two aspects of decisions made without advance public
proceedings that should caution against Chevron deference, and one that
may point the other way. First, the lack of public proceedings makes it
less likely that substantial communication between members of
Congress and agency officials took place before the decision was made,
because no one, including members of Congress, may have notice that
an agency decision is imminent. Second, the private nature of the
proceedings means that any communication between members of
Congress and agency officials that did take place was likely also to be
private, perhaps provoked by a complaint from a constituent, and
congressional pressure is more unlikely than usual to reflect widely-held
views on the subject matter. In other words, this is a situation in which
the negative aspects of congressional administration may counsel against
is determined by whether Congress prescribed a relatively formal procedure such as
adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001). Historically, the rule may have been that agency decisions were
considered to have the force of law (and thus receive deference) only when Congress
specified that the violation of the agency decision carried a sanction. See Thomas
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
424. Mead, 533 U.S. at 218.
425. Id. at 227-28.
426. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
427. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28 (parallel citations omitted).
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deference. On the other side of the coin, less formal, day to day decisions
are likely to involve substantial agency expertise and, in the absence of
congressional pressure, may be apolitical enough to allow us to assume
that the agency is acting in pursuit of the public interest, which is when
deference is most warranted.
In sum, insofar as congressional administration counsels in favor of
greater deference to agency decisions, it supports the Chevron decision
generally, and more specifically the original version of Chevron under
which agency decisions would receive deference unless Congress had
spoken to the very issue under review. Congressional administration
does not, however, support the extension of Chevron’s domain beyond
those decisions in which congressional input and influence is likely, a
universe of decisions that may correspond roughly with the boundaries
drawn in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
C. The Vermont Yankee Doctrine
The final pillar of administrative law discussed here is the Vermont
Yankee doctrine.428 This doctrine holds that unless additional procedures
are constitutionally required, courts may not impose procedural
requirements on agencies in addition to those specified in applicable
statutes and rules.429 This doctrine was imposed by the Supreme Court
in reaction to a tendency of some lower courts, principally the D.C.
Circuit, to adjust the level of procedure required in agency proceedings
in reaction to the importance or complexity of the particular proceeding.
This phenomenon occurred most often on judicial review of agency
rulemaking proceedings.430 The most common manifestations of this
tendency were for lower courts to require additional rounds of notice and
comment in complex rulemakings and for lower courts to require oral
presentation of evidence with the opportunity for opposing parties to
cross-examine witnesses to determine the basis for the rules made.431
428. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
429. Id. at 543-44.
430. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
431. These lower court decisions were often characterized as imposing “hybrid”
procedures on agencies because they imported elements of judicial procedure into the
legislative model created by the APA for agency rulemaking. This practice, and the
general practice of strict application of procedural requirements on judicial review of
agency rulemaking, led to claims that the rulemaking process had become so difficult
and risky that agencies were doing everything they could to avoid it. The critics
characterized the entire package as “ossification” of the rulemaking process. For a
useful exchange on this issue, see Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
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The lower courts supported their actions by arguing that without
additional procedures, the record on judicial review would be
insufficient to support the agency’s ultimate decisions.432 These courts
may also have been concerned with the perception that agencies were
not very responsive to the public will and that agency deliberations were
somewhat hidden from public view and thus subject to all of the abuses
inherent in political systems that lack transparency.
The Vermont Yankee doctrine is based on powerful arguments of
policy and principle. As a policy matter, judicial fine tuning of the level
of procedure required in each agency proceeding put agencies in the
very difficult position of having to predict in advance both the level of
complexity of each proceeding and the judicial reaction to their choice
of procedures for each proceeding. This made the whole process
very unpredictable and created a strong incentive for agencies to
overproceduralize to avoid being reversed for procedural reasons on
judicial review. This undercut Congress’s apparent intent to allow
relatively informal procedures for most rulemakings and adjudications.
These policy reasons are reinforced by more fundamental problems
with pre-Vermont Yankee practice. Courts were, in effect, imposing a
quasi-judicial model on informal agency procedures such as rulemaking
and informal adjudication. This usurped Congress’s power to prescribe
agency procedures and was a fundamental misconception of the nature
of informal agency proceedings. When Congress specified informal
procedures, it intended that agency decisions would be supported by the
type of record that would be produced using those informal procedures.
For example, rulemakings were intended by Congress to be legislative in
nature, and thus a record supported by the informal, legislative
rulemaking process should normally be adequate to support a rule. By
demanding a more developed record, courts were imposing a standard
that could not be met by an agency employing the procedures specified
by Congress.
Even after the Supreme Court came down very hard against judicially
prescribed procedures in addition to those in applicable statutes and
rules, the lower federal courts have not lost their appetite for procedural
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525
(1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 559 (1997).
432. See, e.g., Braniff, 379 F.2d 453.
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fine tuning with minimal statutory support. Courts continue to interpret
some statutory requirements in ways that create the same problems of
predictability and legitimacy that the Court acted against in Vermont
Yankee. For example, consider the way lower courts have applied the
notice requirement of the APA’s informal rulemaking provision.433 The
statute imposes only the minimal requirements of notice of “the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved.”434 Courts have invalidated agency rules that meet those
requirements when the comments convince agencies to issue final rules
that deviate substantially from the proposal. 435 It is very difficult for an
agency to know in advance whether comments will lead to changes in
the proposal, and under the reasoning of Vermont Yankee, as long as the
agency complied with all statutory requirements, it should not be
required to employ additional procedures, such as an additional round of
notice and comment when comments lead it to make substantial changes
between the proposal and the final rule. And consider the decisions
discussed above regarding ex parte communications in rulemaking—the
APA does not prohibit ex parte contacts in rulemaking, yet courts have
stated that ex parte communications are prohibited in rulemaking and
have constructed rules requiring that summaries of such communications
be placed on the public rulemaking record.436 These, and additional
examples,437 establish that the lower federal courts continue to impose
nonstatutory procedural requirements even after the Supreme Court has
twice stated that the practice is forbidden.438
433. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
434. Id.
435. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985); Sprint
Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The lower courts have created a set of
doctrines under which agencies may not adopt final rules that result in “material
alterations” of the proposed rules or that are not the “logical outgrowth” of the proposed
rules, without subjecting the new rules to another round of notice and comment. While
these decisions may seem necessary to ensure the transparency of agency proceedings
(otherwise an agency could hide its true proposal) and the fairness of agency proceedings
(otherwise an affected party may not realize her interests are at stake), they go
substantially beyond the language of the notice requirement. See Am. Water Works
Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
436. See supra Part I.B.3.
437. See, e.g., Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that agency must
reopen notice and comment period if it wishes to rely on comments received after the
close of the initial comment period).
438. Richard Pierce believes that if the Supreme Court took cases on these issues, it
would overrule the lower courts because the Supreme Court sees a greater role for
politics in the administrative system than do the lower courts. See Pierce, supra note
332, at 515-19. My only quibble with Pierce’s prediction is that he predicates the failure
of the Court to overrule the decisions until now on an inability to “fit the issues on its
crowded docket.” Id. at 515. With the Court deciding fewer than a hundred cases per
year, there is plenty of room for any issue the Court sees fit to decide. This makes me
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What does congressional administration have to do with all of this? In
my view, the Vermont Yankee doctrine is a natural corollary to
congressional administration. The fundamental basis of the Vermont
Yankee doctrine is that Congress has, through the APA and other
statutes, struck a balance concerning agency procedure that the courts
have no authority to disregard, absent unconstitutionality. The ongoing
relationship between Congress and the agencies reinforces Congress’s
authority. The more influence that Congress has over the formulation of
policy within agencies, the less need there is for judicial intervention to
increase agency procedures. The lack of formality within an agency is
less a cause for concern when agency action is situated within the
political process. Between Congress and the executive branch, there is
plenty of political accountability to support most agency actions, and
oversight can take care of those situations in which, although all statutes
have been obeyed, there is reason to believe that greater procedural
protections should be afforded to those with an interest in administrative
action. There is no reason for judicial interference in the procedures
established legislatively.439
wonder whether the Court’s failure to resolve these issues lies in the Court’s happiness
with results that may not fit easily into the Court’s overall jurisprudence of
administrative procedure.
439. On the negative view of oversight, congressional administration exacerbates
the problems inherent in the relative lack of transparency of agency proceedings, and
perhaps courts should act to make sure that agencies are fair to those affected by their
actions. On this view, the Vermont Yankee doctrine is misguided insofar as it prevents
courts from increasing the transparency of agency proceedings to ensure that agencies
are not overly influenced by power interests represented by members of Congress.
Cross-examination of witnesses or some other method for deeper examination of the
evidence supporting agencies’ decisions might reveal instances in which agencies were
overly influenced by political factors when expertise should have dominated. However,
even if one takes the negative view of congressional administration, no alteration of
current law might be necessary. The Vermont Yankee doctrine has not been applied in a
very strict manner, and courts have plenty of tools to deal with procedural problems at
the agencies. The Vermont Yankee rule prohibits courts from creating new procedural
requirements by going outside applicable statutes and rules, but does not prevent courts
from interpreting existing procedural requirements broadly to increase fairness and
openness. The rules discussed above discouraging ex parte contacts with agencies
during the pendency of rulemaking proceedings and requiring that the contents of any
such contacts be placed on the record are one example of expansive interpretations of the
APA and other statutes. The lower courts’ application of the notice requirement in
rulemaking is another example of a broad reading of an APA requirement that increases the
fairness and transparency of agency proceedings. Under currently prevailing understandings,
as long as a court reversing an agency on procedural grounds relies only on preexisting
statutes or rules, there is no Vermont Yankee violation even if the application of the statutes or
rules is expansive. The Supreme Court may, in the interests of certainty and predictability,
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III. CONCLUSION
Congress is intimately involved in the execution of the law, both
formally through legislative and other controls on the executive branch
and informally through oversight, investigations, direct contacts, and
other political methods. The extensive network of formal and informal
oversight gives Congress a great deal of influence over the execution of
the law without exceeding constitutional limits on congressional action.
The law should recognize that Congress remains keenly interested in the
execution of the law even when it has delegated substantial discretion to
administrative agencies. The reality of congressional administration is
consistent with the lenient nondelegation doctrine, the deferential
version of the Chevron doctrine and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, with
the caveat that the results might be different if oversight gives power
only to a narrow group within Congress which is particularly interested
in the administration of the particular law and whose preferences deviate
substantially from those of Congress as a whole.

rein in this practice, but the lower courts have been doing this for a long time without
interference from the Supreme Court.
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